The Case Against BIP-110 with Erik Aronesty | Bitcoin Infinity Show #201


Erik Aronesty joins the Bitcoin Infinity Show to talk about his role in BIP 148 and the User-Activated Soft Fork that reshaped the block size wars, and why he eventually traded his big-block stance for a small-block one rooted in bandwidth and node decentralization. He shares hard-earned lessons on Bitcoin mining economics, the long-term security budget question, and why he believes Bitcoin still needs protocol-level privacy through ideas like Mimblewimble alongside covenants like OPCTV for vaulting and self-custody. The conversation digs into BIP 110, OPRETURN policy, the difference between consensus and mempool rules, the dangers of KYC exchanges and Coinbase, and what it actually takes to keep Bitcoin sound money for the next generation.
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00:00 - Eric's Bitcoin journey and background
01:37 - Block size wars and decentralization
04:59 - Bitcoin security budget debate
08:50 - Bitcoin for exchange versus store of value
14:55 - Privacy, censorship, and Bitcoin Core
23:51 - The UASF and Core's political nature
29:33 - OpReturn, Ordinals, and BIP110
42:35 - Key protocol features: privacy, vaults, VTXOs
51:18 - Taproot's benefits and unforeseen abuse
01:01:06 - Miner incentives and BIP110 risks
01:14:18 - Centralized exchanges: an enemy of Bitcoin
01:19:43 - KYC and the purpose of money
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Eric, welcome to the Bitcoin Infinity Show. Nice to have you here.
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Hi, yeah. Thanks a lot. Nice to be here. It's nice meeting you.
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Yeah, nice meeting you too. I mean, we haven't met before. I don't think we've had many interactions at all.
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We had some interaction last week and that's about it.
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But you are just, you're a seasoned Bitcoiner too.
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Yes.
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I think I can call myself that now after a decade.
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We have slightly different memories of the block size wars, I think.
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But first of all, can you give our listeners a TLDR on who you are and your backstory, why people should listen to you?
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Okay.
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I'm a software engineer with 30-some years' experience.
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I published a number of cryptography papers.
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And I was a CTO of a security company, specifically a multi-factor encryption storage company.
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So I know a little bit about security, a little bit about software.
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And I've been involved in Bitcoin for well over 10 years now.
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And, you know, I've been in and out of the IRC channels, done some, you know, code reviews and that sort of thing.
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So, yeah, I'm somebody with a significant amount of experience and some expertise in the area.
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Yes, and you had a backstory with BIP148, it's called, right?
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The user-activated soft fork back in the block size wars.
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So can you give us your version of what happened during the block size wars, please?
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Sure.
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So I, at the beginning, I was all over. Back then, Bitcoin Reddit was where a lot of conversation was happening more than Twitter now. I was on there and I was pretty firmly advocating for the larger block size because I thought, you know, the most important thing about Bitcoin is for it to be used every day. I want coffee on Bitcoin. I still do. Personally, I use BitRefill to get that done, but I do wish I didn't have to.
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And so for me, it seemed to make a lot of sense to just let transactions be as fast and robust as they want.
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Now, obviously, there's a lot of arguments against that.
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The biggest argument was, hey, it's expensive to run a node.
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And I thought, you know, people just pay extra money.
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Hard drive space is cheap.
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What's the big deal?
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But the other argument, which was maybe not talked about as much, was the fact that miners need their subsidies.
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And this is a longer term thinking.
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So this is actually what convinced me.
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yes people need to run nodes i believed that you know technology was cheap software was getting
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cheaper hard drive space was getting cheaper and people would always be able to run nodes if they
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were an economic player um obviously non-economic nodes don't really matter that much in the big
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picture of things but if you're sitting on a whole bitcoin and you're spending and you're
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receiving transactions and you're emerging somewhere that's a node holder that with some
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economic weight.
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Hardless, when I thought about it a little more, I realized that if blocks were unlimited,
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people would be able to spend a Satoshi to get a transaction done, and there'd be no
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reason why miners wouldn't include it.
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And as a result, blocks would not subsidize miners well.
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that some competition for fees is required
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and that small blocks are ultimately best for decentralization
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for bandwidth reasons more than storage.
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So there's like many, many layers to this
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as to why small blocks are better.
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They're better for bandwidth.
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Storage, I think, is secondary.
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I always will because I just don't think it's a big deal to most people
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to buy an extra $40 hard drive.
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But bandwidth is huge.
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I have run a Bitcoin node that is open public and I no longer do so because the bandwidth just kicks my connection.
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People use it for their mobile devices all day long.
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It gets spammed and attacked all day long.
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It's just not really worth it for me.
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And so imagine if that's, you know, times 10, that would be horrible.
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So you'd have a lot fewer people running public nodes.
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And that convinced me.
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Bootstrapping a node is still expensive.
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That would be worse as well.
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So there's a lot of reasons to keep block sizes small.
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But the initial reason for keeping block sizes big,
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which is I want people to use Bitcoin every day,
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and I don't think simply sitting on Bitcoin
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is good for the network or for the value of my coin.
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The value of everyone else's, that remains.
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So that's why I've sort of pivoted away
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from being somebody who cared about Blickbox
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to somebody who cares about usage
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and using it as a means of exchange.
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Okay, before we go on, I'd like to offer you my point of view on this and why I'm not worried about any security budget or why I'm not worried about miners and miner revenue.
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And if we look at Bitcoin today, the current hash rate is around 900 exahashes per second.
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That is 9, 0, 0, or a 9 followed by 20 zeros worth of guesses to find the next block.
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And this block has to follow all the rules, right?
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So it's orders of magnitude more secure than it needs to be.
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And also, if we have the difficulty adjustment algorithm,
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so mining is always going to be a very competitive game.
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where there's very small margin.
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I don't know what you mean by needs to be, but go on.
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Well, have you noticed any double-spent transactions lately?
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I think it's been working flawlessly for, what, 16, 17 years now, right?
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I just don't know what the definition of need is, that's all.
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I feel like it's a...
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I get it's big.
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It's an arbitrarily big number,
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but I don't...
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And I do know it's very big,
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but I don't know what the word...
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I think that the word need can be defined
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more precisely yeah okay so so let's try to do that like would a hundred x would a 900
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petahashes be enough for gigahashes no it's not about the hashes i think that's that's clear
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um it's definitely more about the total value of the hardware deployed by all the miners
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all right yeah so and and i'd say it's more i'd say it's more about the total value of
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the nodes uh as as a counter to that because this the the node the initial the cost of running a
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node although as you say it's a small problem now and if you're running a significant node
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you you will can probably afford it anyway the problem is that it's a forever problem
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as we add more data to the time chain or blockchain,
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it's bound to grow forever.
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And I think that increasing the block size
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back in the block size wars
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would have been a super bad idea
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because it sets a precedent for doing that again.
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It's hard forking and setting a precedent for very bad.
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And we did increase it.
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We did increase it, but in a very subtle way.
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We increased it via a soft fork instead of a hard fork, right?
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Yeah.
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But the increase, I think, was was I think fairly modest.
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I think, you know, the maximum was like four megabytes now.
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And I think that most people at the time thought, well, I could handle four megabytes and no more than that.
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And I think four megabytes is probably too big, personally.
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Yeah. Same here. Same here. I wish it was smaller.
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I wish it was in hindsight. Yeah.
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So, yeah, in hindsight, I do think the ratio of witness expense versus, you know, non-witness expense feels right.
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I think that was that ratio was was was based on good computation, good calculations.
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So I just think the the total should just be smaller.
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Right. We should probably have like a 500 K and a two megabyte or whatever.
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You know, like a cut it in half. I think we feel a little better.
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But again, it's an arbitrary thing.
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At least it's fixed.
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We never have to raise it ever, ever, ever.
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I'm not worried about that.
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No.
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And also we have layer two solutions.
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We have Lightning to offload.
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Lightning offload quite a bit right now.
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Lightning obviously can't scale to everyone using it on a daily basis.
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There are minor changes we could make to the soft work changes we could do to make it.
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so that everybody could use lightning.
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The other point where I have a slight disagreement
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is the I want Bitcoin to be used,
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and that meaning as a medium of exchange over space
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rather than time.
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Because from my knowledge of Austrian economics,
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money is never idle.
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It always provides its owner with some value.
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At the very least, a psychological comfort
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that I have this money,
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I can spend it at some point in the future.
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So I think long-term hodling over generations
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is a very valid use case, if not the best use case for Bitcoin.
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I think it's a great use case.
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I think that without use over time, there are other risks.
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And it's not just fees.
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Fees are important.
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They will get more important slowly over time.
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Right now, I think the total mining hardware deployment is in the $40 billion range.
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So it's plenty.
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No one's going to double spend that.
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No.
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So do you foresee a future where hodlers are incentivized to mine simply because they want to secure their Bitcoin?
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Absolutely.
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If I personally owned, you know, a billion dollars worth of Bitcoin, which I don't, but I wish I did.
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No, if I personally owned a billion dollars of Bitcoin, there's no doubt in my mind I would run, you know, $10 million worth of mining just to keep it decentralized.
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Why wouldn't I do that?
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A, it's profitable.
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And even if it's not profitable, I could break even.
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So absolutely.
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Holders becoming miners should naturally occur in order to secure the system.
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That's perfectly reasonable.
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Yeah.
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That leads us to a proof-of-stake world, which I don't love.
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No, no, no.
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Okay.
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But other things, though, such as I got a beautiful, often too, the 21 Energy home mining heating system.
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So it's really for heating your home primarily.
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The Bitcoin mining is sort of a side effect.
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But I run that, of course, because why wouldn't I?
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It's giving me some money back on my electricity bill.
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And if I can be prudent and hodl that for a decade or seven, then it's bound to be worth more in the future because of the wonderful number go up technology.
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That's how I see that.
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And I think these secondary use cases for miners in terms of heating stuff.
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I've done a ton of mining, and I can tell you a little bit about mining economics.
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I've invested a lot of my money in mining over the years.
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Yeah.
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And so what do you foresee for the future?
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I guess my real question is, is this security budget FUD, is there anything real to it or will all those things sort themselves out, especially given that Bitcoin will, if you take for granted that Bitcoin doubles in price every four years, there's no problem, right? Because then at least not until 2140.
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Well, that's true. Bitcoin doubling in price helps. The problem is the value of money is going down and the use of Bitcoin in institutional transfers is going up. And it's only a matter of time before the incentive for a double spend attack begins to approach the value of the ASICs in production.
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So, you know, it's a question of whether, I think if we continue on the trajectory, if we continue the way we are now with, you know, subset fees and almost no chain usage and subsidy as the only source of revenue, it could be maybe 10 to 20 years before it matters.
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before people are like, wait a second.
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Holders now have to mine.
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Stakeholders are now become sort of this sort of double, double.
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Right now, there's sort of a trifecta of miners,
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holders, and merchants and exchanges, right?
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You've got the holders, which are very important.
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They run their own nodes.
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They're validating their own transactions.
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You've got the miners, which have the investment.
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And then you have the exchanges and merchants
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that are performing the day-to-day transactions and things.
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And they sort of have, it's like this,
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a nice separation of concerns
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and they all have different,
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and it keeps Bitcoin somewhat stable.
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The sort of Nash equilibrium is somewhat stable
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between those different entities.
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But if you shift to where all the holders are also miners,
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now the merchants and exchange holders become nobodies.
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The only thing that matters are the holders.
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And I'm not sure what development looks like
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in that world where transaction usage becomes less important over time.
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Why wouldn't merchants run their own nodes, though?
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Well, they do.
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They will.
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They always will.
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It's just when I say important, I mean, you know,
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there's a balance between the importance of miners
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and the importance of node holders and the importance of coin holders.
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Not all coin holders run nodes Fact Nope Absolutely not Not all merchants Almost all merchants run nodes And all miners run nodes
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And then the rest of the nodes that are on the network that are none of those three,
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they're developers, volunteers, people who have a point,
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people who believe in sovereignty and just want to run their own nodes.
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And that's important, but it's less important than those three groups.
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When I say less important, I mean, if there were ever a hard fork and all three of those groups switched over, that's the hard fork that would have all value.
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I mean, it's pretty abundantly clear that that's the hard fork that would obtain all of the value and the people, the hobbyists and the developers and the people who love Bitcoin would be left out to drift.
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And the balance between those three communities, I think, is important so that the hobbyists aren't left out to drift and the developers aren't left out to drift.
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But it's a very tenuous balancing act.
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And that's what I was talking about before.
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There's the stuff people talk about in Bitcoin development world, and there's the stuff they don't talk about.
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And I think people were worried for a long time about the subsidy declining over forever.
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And they don't want to talk about it because they don't want to admit that Bitcoin is vulnerable.
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And so they come up with other reasons why they need usage.
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They say, oh, it's because, you know, we want vaulting and we want privacy.
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And I think those things are great.
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I actually firmly believe that Bitcoin should have a privacy layer.
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I think it should have a vaulting system.
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I think that covenants are important.
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I think all that stuff is important.
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But I think the secret reason that people don't love to talk about is the reason why we don't have privacy is they are afraid of the government.
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Everyone's they saw what happened to Litecoin getting banned from different exchanges.
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And they're like, oh, I don't want that to happen to Bitcoin.
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So we're not going to put privacy on Bitcoin.
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It's a simple fork.
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The code's been proven.
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It's in production.
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People have been using Litecoin for a while now.
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There's millions and millions of dollars tied up in the Mimblewimble blocks on Litecoin.
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Why not take that proven technology and add it to Bitcoin?
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That's kind of what Litecoin's for.
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And the answer is people are afraid.
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They don't talk about that.
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Really, is that the only answer, though?
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Mimblewimble?
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I think it is.
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Mimblewimble, like, putting more data on chain?
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No, not really.
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Are there trade-offs?
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I don't think it's putting more data on chain.
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00:16:08,767 --> 00:16:16,587
No, it's Mimblewimble blocks are not particularly burdensome to nodes or miners.
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Would that require a hard fork, by the way?
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No, it's not a hard fork.
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Mimblewimble is a soft fork, opt-in, privacy layer that you can use or not use.
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From what I've seen on the Litecoin network is it encourages usage.
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People use it.
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They use it instead of using mixers.
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And wouldn't it be lovely if I didn't have to use a mixer, if people didn't have to go to jail?
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It's a terrible thing that happened because we don't have privacy on Bitcoin.
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And it would be nice if Bitcoin supported that.
259
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But I think people are, I think the root reason why people are worried is, oh, my God, don't change this thing because we've got ETFs, we've got institutions, we've got governments, and we need to get them all on board first before we do anything to change that.
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And it's sort of like, I don't know, you're begging government for its approval.
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And at some point, that is a losing proposition.
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I don't know when it becomes a losing proposition.
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But at some point, you know, there's no doubt in my mind that the government is not Bitcoin's friend.
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No, no, no.
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It can't be.
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Like, Bitcoin is the antidote to the government, right?
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It's the antidote to the government.
268
00:17:24,147 --> 00:17:28,287
But to be fair, the pay joins and coin joins work.
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They still work.
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I mean, you know, you have to know what you're doing, but there's nothing hindering you from doing it.
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No, no, they're perfectly fine.
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The user interface is actually good these days.
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You send your coin somewhere, you sit on it for a week and then you bring them back and then they're clean.
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It's not difficult.
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It's a little more expensive than I think it has to be.
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I think that one of the interesting facts is that almost any covenant opcode can be turned into an on-chain coin joint protocol.
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Did you know that?
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Almost anyone.
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I can't say that I did know that.
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I'm skeptic about covenants, but mostly because all the people I see on X that have covenants and CTV in their handles are saying absurd things every now and then.
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And I base my skepticism on that.
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And I'm in camp, like, if it ain't broke, don't fix it.
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And do as little as possible.
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Because every time you do anything, you change the incentives.
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That's true.
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You definitely risk disturbing the equilibrium we have if you change anything.
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However, we do change every four years, inevitably.
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And the equilibrium will get disturbed.
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And it has been in the past, and it will get disturbed again.
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00:18:46,867 --> 00:18:52,967
Well, I wouldn't say that call the halving a disturbance because it's absolutely planned.
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It's planned, but it seems to shake up the space every time a little bit, doesn't it?
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I mean, every four years.
293
00:19:00,327 --> 00:19:03,567
Well, if you're unprepared, well, why are you?
294
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You haven't done your homework then.
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Right.
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That's on the user, not on the network.
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Like everyone knows that there's a halving.
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I don't know of a single Bitcoiner that isn't aware of the halvings as a thing.
299
00:19:16,867 --> 00:19:21,207
And yet miners always seem to panic and struggle and sell.
300
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Yeah, but this is the scariest part because miners seem to be the least knowledgeable about the philosophical impacts of deflationary money.
301
00:19:30,967 --> 00:19:38,267
To me, it seems like many of the large miners are the most fiat-minded people in the Bitcoin space.
302
00:19:38,427 --> 00:19:39,547
And that's what I'm so afraid of.
303
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Because they have to sell all the time.
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They have to pay the rent.
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00:19:41,347 --> 00:19:47,847
You're forced as a miner to sell on a regular basis and switch in and out of fiat.
306
00:19:48,287 --> 00:19:52,627
One of the biggest problems Bitcoin has is the onboarding problem.
307
00:19:52,787 --> 00:19:53,807
How do you obtain Bitcoin?
308
00:19:55,407 --> 00:19:57,287
And there's no great way of doing it.
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00:19:57,607 --> 00:19:58,787
Exchanges are horrible.
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You're showing your driver's license on a screen.
311
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It's terrible.
312
00:20:03,687 --> 00:20:05,927
I acquired most of my Bitcoin in person.
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00:20:06,607 --> 00:20:09,247
For many, many years, I would meet people.
314
00:20:09,247 --> 00:20:11,747
some dude would drive up in a car
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00:20:11,747 --> 00:20:13,567
and I would hand him cash
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at a Starbucks
317
00:20:14,907 --> 00:20:17,388
Have you heard of Vexel?
318
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Yes
319
00:20:18,647 --> 00:20:21,227
A super interesting project where you can
320
00:20:21,227 --> 00:20:22,587
so check out Vexel
321
00:20:22,587 --> 00:20:23,727
V-E-X-L
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where you can
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00:20:24,547 --> 00:20:28,547
The app basically uploads
324
00:20:28,547 --> 00:20:30,587
hashes of your phone book
325
00:20:30,587 --> 00:20:32,487
contacts so no actual numbers
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and then that's on one server in one
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00:20:34,247 --> 00:20:36,547
jurisdiction and then all
328
00:20:36,547 --> 00:20:38,647
the encrypted messaging is on another server
329
00:20:38,647 --> 00:20:43,767
in another jurisdiction and they match you and say that you have this and this friend in common
330
00:20:43,767 --> 00:20:49,807
would you like to meet this guy in a dark alley somewhere and if you know the same people yeah the
331
00:20:49,807 --> 00:20:55,427
the likelihood that he will scam you is of course lower it's a reputation-based system and it's
332
00:20:55,427 --> 00:21:00,567
really big in prague at the moment but it hasn't really taken off but i think such bisque is one
333
00:21:00,567 --> 00:21:08,187
thing and there are solutions but but i would definitely what i always recommend to people is
334
00:21:08,187 --> 00:21:14,487
Like if you're buying on an exchange, I mean, keep your KYC stack and your non-KYC stack separate.
335
00:21:14,787 --> 00:21:17,147
Like that's the crucial thing.
336
00:21:17,647 --> 00:21:35,847
And also from having worked slightly at an exchange in some type of advisory role, I know that they have to do in very many countries, they have to do the chain analytics or chain anal thing and track everything.
337
00:21:35,847 --> 00:21:42,987
But basically no flags are raised before you get a large sum of money into a bank account.
338
00:21:43,467 --> 00:21:51,287
So if you sell for cash, no one's going to scour the blockchain for cash payments and assume.
339
00:21:51,587 --> 00:21:53,107
That just doesn't happen.
340
00:21:53,347 --> 00:21:54,927
So as long as you don't buy a super yacht.
341
00:21:55,247 --> 00:21:55,967
Keep your spends small.
342
00:21:56,447 --> 00:21:57,007
Keep your cash.
343
00:21:57,527 --> 00:22:00,447
If you're going to do online transactions, keep them small.
344
00:22:01,207 --> 00:22:03,547
And yeah, don't worry about your cash too much.
345
00:22:03,607 --> 00:22:04,547
And again, keep it small.
346
00:22:04,547 --> 00:22:11,067
There was that guy that was arrested in Florida for buying and selling Bitcoin for cash not long ago.
347
00:22:11,407 --> 00:22:12,527
Well, maybe it was a while ago.
348
00:22:13,207 --> 00:22:14,227
But that happens.
349
00:22:14,727 --> 00:22:21,907
Once you hit a million or two million dollars in transactions, the government turns its ugly head on you and calls you a money transmitter and then puts you in jail.
350
00:22:23,327 --> 00:22:25,148
And that happens all the time.
351
00:22:25,148 --> 00:22:35,707
It's a risk anyone runs trying to just obtain Bitcoin in a way that's somewhat traceless because you don't necessarily want the government knowing everything about your Bitcoin.
352
00:22:37,047 --> 00:22:44,467
And this is one of the reasons why I like covenants, because I think, you know, if you have something like OpsiTV on the chain, covenants are very simple.
353
00:22:44,467 --> 00:22:53,347
It's just when I you give me a you give me a you give me a you give me a an address and your address is committing to a future spend.
354
00:22:53,347 --> 00:22:56,167
You as the recipient get to choose
355
00:22:56,167 --> 00:22:57,527
Whether or not you use covenants
356
00:22:57,527 --> 00:22:58,727
They're not forced on anybody
357
00:22:58,727 --> 00:23:01,127
And that's a mistake that people have
358
00:23:01,127 --> 00:23:02,787
They think it's like, oh, it's forced on you
359
00:23:02,787 --> 00:23:03,367
It's not
360
00:23:03,367 --> 00:23:06,367
You choose because you want to tie it up in a certain way
361
00:23:06,367 --> 00:23:09,148
And the result of tying it up in that way
362
00:23:09,148 --> 00:23:10,667
Could be, imagine
363
00:23:10,667 --> 00:23:13,307
Tying it up with nine other people
364
00:23:13,307 --> 00:23:14,347
In a joint
365
00:23:14,347 --> 00:23:17,087
Now you've got this lovely thing
366
00:23:17,087 --> 00:23:19,247
Where you've committed to future transactions
367
00:23:19,247 --> 00:23:21,447
That are going to occur in a regular cadence
368
00:23:21,447 --> 00:23:23,007
And then are going to be exited
369
00:23:23,007 --> 00:23:30,648
And now basically you've produced a coin join with no coordination at all or with minimal coordination.
370
00:23:31,267 --> 00:23:37,407
In fact, you can show that most covenants can be turned into clever coin join protocols that reduce coordinator necessities.
371
00:23:37,907 --> 00:23:37,967
Anyway.
372
00:23:38,148 --> 00:23:38,247
Yeah.
373
00:23:38,607 --> 00:23:42,207
It sounds like something my mother will adopt instantly.
374
00:23:42,967 --> 00:23:49,287
The nice thing about it is that you can make it easy and standard and baked into wallets if you want.
375
00:23:49,767 --> 00:23:49,967
Yeah.
376
00:23:49,967 --> 00:23:51,227
All right.
377
00:23:51,587 --> 00:23:52,787
Back to the block size wars.
378
00:23:53,007 --> 00:23:55,107
And this user-activated software.
379
00:23:55,727 --> 00:23:57,927
I'm keen to hear the entire story there.
380
00:23:58,427 --> 00:24:02,187
So basically what happened was I submitted a pull request.
381
00:24:02,367 --> 00:24:05,207
So somebody else wrote it UASF fork.
382
00:24:05,367 --> 00:24:08,547
I think it might have been SIPA, but I don't remember who wrote it.
383
00:24:08,687 --> 00:24:09,547
I just can't recall.
384
00:24:09,687 --> 00:24:11,247
I have to go look at my GitHub history.
385
00:24:11,907 --> 00:24:16,888
And it was just sitting out there as a fork, but no pull requests had been submitted.
386
00:24:17,107 --> 00:24:21,347
And there were also minor changes that had to be done before it could be a pull request.
387
00:24:21,347 --> 00:24:26,987
It was sort of intended to be a, you download this version of Bitcoin and run it and signal UASF.
388
00:24:28,047 --> 00:24:30,247
And so people were downloading it, running it and signaling.
389
00:24:30,927 --> 00:24:33,027
Some significant economic nodes were signaling.
390
00:24:33,427 --> 00:24:36,487
And eventually what I did is I, why isn't it a pull request?
391
00:24:36,587 --> 00:24:37,888
I made what little changes were needed.
392
00:24:38,007 --> 00:24:40,527
I provided a detailed description and I submitted a PR.
393
00:24:40,747 --> 00:24:43,167
And when I submitted a PR, I got a bunch of people.
394
00:24:43,487 --> 00:24:48,987
I remember Luke was one of them that texted me or whatever or DMed me and were like, hey, thanks a lot.
395
00:24:48,987 --> 00:24:51,947
that's something we couldn't have done.
396
00:24:53,167 --> 00:24:55,567
And again, it was like, I'm involved with Bitcoin Core.
397
00:24:55,707 --> 00:24:58,027
Bitcoin Core could not have done that politically.
398
00:24:58,847 --> 00:25:01,148
And I found that interesting on many levels.
399
00:25:01,148 --> 00:25:05,267
One is 100% of the Bitcoin Core developers
400
00:25:05,267 --> 00:25:07,047
were aware of the political ramifications
401
00:25:07,047 --> 00:25:08,447
of submitting a pull request.
402
00:25:08,907 --> 00:25:10,807
That's a strange place to work.
403
00:25:11,027 --> 00:25:13,527
That's not a regular, I work at a lot of software companies,
404
00:25:13,747 --> 00:25:16,687
but consider that they all thought it should be done
405
00:25:16,687 --> 00:25:18,847
and nobody was willing to do it.
406
00:25:18,987 --> 00:25:39,967
They were willing to advocate for it and talk about it, but they needed their rough consensus first. But, you know, like they had to get everyone on board before any pull request was submitted. The political nature of Bitcoin is deep and entrenched and old and is annoying. It is not. I get it. I understand why it happens, but it's just what is what it is.
407
00:25:39,967 --> 00:25:50,587
So so what you see on the surface, the comments on pull requests and the posts on Twitter is not always what is actually happening.
408
00:25:50,987 --> 00:25:55,967
Pull requests are not happening for reasons that they're only willing to discuss in private chats.
409
00:25:56,227 --> 00:25:58,307
And and that's true for a lot of things.
410
00:25:58,407 --> 00:26:02,587
And so it does make you want to take a step back and sort of question motivations of things.
411
00:26:02,587 --> 00:26:09,727
And I get that. You know, I think that's that's it's important to know that there is a there are there's a public face and a private face.
412
00:26:09,727 --> 00:26:14,307
of core and the core contributors and you can tell the difference too the people who submit you can go
413
00:26:14,307 --> 00:26:18,547
to the github history and you can see there's lots of people who submit all sorts of crazy prs that
414
00:26:18,547 --> 00:26:23,907
are just delete delete delete delete um and then there's the ones that people listen to um and
415
00:26:23,907 --> 00:26:29,547
there are different groups of people yeah and and i think that is a part of the criticism that has
416
00:26:29,547 --> 00:26:36,847
come from uh the knots campus specifically here in the last couple of months it's just this uh
417
00:26:36,847 --> 00:26:43,267
how core refuses to listen to certain voices and the politicization of the like john attack had a
418
00:26:43,267 --> 00:26:51,148
great uh talk in in san salvador about how woke ideology has sort of crept in uh it's crept the
419
00:26:51,148 --> 00:26:56,507
word like creeping into to core over the years starting back in 2019 even
420
00:26:56,507 --> 00:27:04,807
there's diversity hires and so which i i know that a lot of bitcoin hodlers don't agree with
421
00:27:04,807 --> 00:27:09,327
any of those politics. A lot of Bitcoin hodlers are ANCAPs and super conservatives.
422
00:27:10,607 --> 00:27:17,987
So what are your thoughts on that? I don't believe you should ever judge open source code by the
423
00:27:17,987 --> 00:27:23,888
behavior of the people who contribute to it. You should judge it on the code. And I think that's
424
00:27:23,888 --> 00:27:32,127
difficult because if you are not a very technical person and you are not somebody who reads code
425
00:27:32,127 --> 00:27:37,127
and understands it, all you have to go on is,
426
00:27:37,467 --> 00:27:39,167
do I trust this guy?
427
00:27:39,167 --> 00:27:59,255
And so now you have this social signal which is not a good signal because people are flawed People are wrong I remember when I was at that security company my CEO was a big Bitcoiner early Bitcoiner And I wanted to hire
428
00:27:59,255 --> 00:28:06,875
Peter Todd. I texted him. I had talked to him a number of times. And I was like, I want to bring
429
00:28:06,875 --> 00:28:11,475
this guy in just for a week to review our cryptography because I think he's really good
430
00:28:11,475 --> 00:28:16,875
at it. And he is. He's an empirical cryptographer. He's not a theoretical cryptographer. He's not
431
00:28:16,875 --> 00:28:20,835
someone who publishes big, long papers about proofs. But he has a really good instinct about
432
00:28:20,835 --> 00:28:26,835
when stuff is broken. And I was writing code and I was a little worried that it might be broken.
433
00:28:26,935 --> 00:28:31,395
And I was like, I just want to bring him in and take a look at it. And Tan said, don't work with
434
00:28:31,395 --> 00:28:37,255
that guy. He's so difficult to work with because he knew him. And I said, that's interesting.
435
00:28:37,455 --> 00:28:42,215
You know, yeah. Is he difficult to work with? Maybe that's true, but I don't care. See,
436
00:28:42,275 --> 00:28:46,655
that's the difference between me and my CEO. I didn't care. I was willing to work with somebody
437
00:28:46,655 --> 00:28:51,355
even for a little bit of time who might have been toxic and difficult to work with and had
438
00:28:51,355 --> 00:28:55,595
a hard personality in exchange for getting a lot of expertise. And I always will be that way. I
439
00:28:55,595 --> 00:29:01,075
would much rather have worked with somebody who disagrees with me and calls me on my shit and
440
00:29:01,075 --> 00:29:05,575
says you're wrong about these 10 things and you're an idiot than somebody who agrees with
441
00:29:05,575 --> 00:29:12,355
everything they say. And so, yeah, I don't care what the political environment is that much. I
442
00:29:12,355 --> 00:29:17,875
care when people are keeping secrets, keeping the truth away. Those matter to me. And I care when
443
00:29:17,875 --> 00:29:22,035
people are, you know, submitting pull requests with good code that make sense and strengthen
444
00:29:22,035 --> 00:29:32,355
Bitcoin and solve bugs and are aligned with the network and the incentives and the maintenance
445
00:29:32,355 --> 00:29:33,575
and the stewardship of the network.
446
00:29:33,695 --> 00:29:36,135
That, to me, matters more than anything else.
447
00:29:36,135 --> 00:29:40,975
However, the good example is the uncapping of OpReturn.
448
00:29:41,155 --> 00:29:45,375
I think it's politically handled as badly as it possibly could be.
449
00:29:45,535 --> 00:29:46,555
I understand the arguments.
450
00:29:46,555 --> 00:29:57,555
There were subset fees being transmitted on the network for, you know, months that were filtered by policy, but were mined so frequently that it was the majority of transactions.
451
00:29:58,175 --> 00:30:00,695
So I was just showing you the policy wasn't really stopping anything.
452
00:30:01,595 --> 00:30:08,075
I understand that OpReturn is the most desirable place on the blockchain for an undesirable thing, spam.
453
00:30:08,075 --> 00:30:12,915
And when I say that, I mean it doesn't create a UTXO.
454
00:30:13,115 --> 00:30:15,795
It is easily prunable, filterable.
455
00:30:16,555 --> 00:30:22,975
It's a known place where junk lives, so we can block it from the block explorers or things like that.
456
00:30:23,335 --> 00:30:24,935
So I understand the rationale.
457
00:30:25,415 --> 00:30:33,155
And then also, finally, compact block relay protocol requires that mempools are in sync with what miners are doing.
458
00:30:33,635 --> 00:30:34,855
Why is that important?
459
00:30:35,615 --> 00:30:39,595
Because it reduces the amount of work that nodes have to do.
460
00:30:40,375 --> 00:30:40,835
That's all.
461
00:30:41,215 --> 00:30:42,695
It just reduces the amount of work.
462
00:30:42,695 --> 00:30:50,935
If you can know that your mempool matched the next block, then you don't need to compute as much when you accept that next block.
463
00:30:51,455 --> 00:30:54,675
When the block comes down, when the block is mined.
464
00:30:55,255 --> 00:30:56,215
And why is that desirable?
465
00:30:57,515 --> 00:31:05,815
Just less work for nodes is good because you want to keep the burden on nodes low.
466
00:31:06,035 --> 00:31:07,675
Same reason why small blocks are good.
467
00:31:09,555 --> 00:31:10,655
Yeah, all right.
468
00:31:10,655 --> 00:31:22,755
So I think there's a difference in, okay, I've heard this explanation a million times because I've interviewed a ton of people on both sides and I'm super into this.
469
00:31:23,375 --> 00:31:26,255
There's also one more reason too that I haven't given, but go on.
470
00:31:26,255 --> 00:31:50,575
Okay, so if you look back at the original Opera Term Wars in 2014, and how both Vitalik and this counterparty guy has said explicitly that they left Bitcoin and started their own shitcoin chains because the developers in Bitcoin were clearly signaling that we don't want your spammy shit here.
471
00:31:50,575 --> 00:31:53,615
Like, we're going to optimize for money and not for anything else.
472
00:31:53,615 --> 00:32:05,455
So I do think that the argument for the Nought side and for the BIP-110 side now is that we want to signal that as hard as we can because these are squatters.
473
00:32:05,675 --> 00:32:07,575
They are playing checkers in the chess club.
474
00:32:07,955 --> 00:32:09,115
We don't want them here.
475
00:32:09,595 --> 00:32:13,335
They are exploiting what Luke describes as a bug.
476
00:32:13,655 --> 00:32:17,675
I like the word exploit because I think they're exploiting something.
477
00:32:17,855 --> 00:32:21,215
I don't necessarily view it as a bug, but it's an exploit.
478
00:32:21,215 --> 00:32:26,755
And the question becomes, can something be done about it?
479
00:32:26,835 --> 00:32:28,675
And then should something be done about it?
480
00:32:28,915 --> 00:32:30,635
And if that's what?
481
00:32:30,815 --> 00:32:39,315
And I think this is what splits the community right now, if this thing is going to do anything or not.
482
00:32:39,535 --> 00:32:41,535
So what's your take on BIP-110?
483
00:32:42,755 --> 00:32:44,975
Do you like parts of it?
484
00:32:45,775 --> 00:32:48,255
There are parts I like.
485
00:32:48,255 --> 00:32:54,855
So anything that restricts operand size in the witness segment is good.
486
00:32:54,995 --> 00:32:58,215
So the 520 byte limit's hard, you know, hard capping that.
487
00:32:58,815 --> 00:33:10,515
I like that because I don't think there is a legitimate or even discussed use case for arbitrarily large, you know, push, for example, right?
488
00:33:10,575 --> 00:33:15,035
Like there's just there's no reason for arbitrarily large arguments.
489
00:33:15,035 --> 00:33:23,275
the the one thing you could say sorry sorry for interrupting but is that because that incentivizes
490
00:33:23,275 --> 00:33:28,495
shitcoinery on bitcoin basically like these large things incentivizes put you can always do shit
491
00:33:28,495 --> 00:33:33,195
coins on bitcoin right colored coins were shit coins on bitcoin that that you can't that you can't
492
00:33:33,195 --> 00:33:37,375
change that there's nothing you can do about no no no but you can make it more uh you can make it
493
00:33:37,375 --> 00:33:43,635
less uh you can make it more costly to to have to adapt all the time no because if you want i could
494
00:33:43,635 --> 00:33:49,155
come up with a protocol tomorrow that just says, you know, any transaction that's, you
495
00:33:49,155 --> 00:33:52,875
know, of the following shape, you know, is a shitcoin.
496
00:33:53,575 --> 00:33:55,235
Look up the colored coins protocol.
497
00:33:55,575 --> 00:33:57,715
I remember the colored coin thing.
498
00:33:57,795 --> 00:34:01,555
But the thing is, it doesn't take off because you can't run the same scam twice.
499
00:34:01,555 --> 00:34:04,155
Or sometimes you can because there's always a bigger fool.
500
00:34:04,415 --> 00:34:07,595
But the thing is, these things go away.
501
00:34:07,855 --> 00:34:08,375
Color coins still work.
502
00:34:09,295 --> 00:34:10,715
Yes, but no one uses it.
503
00:34:11,215 --> 00:34:13,535
It's a wonderful protocol for shitcoins on Bitcoin.
504
00:34:13,635 --> 00:34:14,835
It's better than all the other ones.
505
00:34:14,895 --> 00:34:15,835
It's better than OpReturn.
506
00:34:16,235 --> 00:34:17,035
Why would nobody use it?
507
00:34:17,035 --> 00:34:17,895
It's a better protocol.
508
00:34:18,175 --> 00:34:18,975
It's more efficient.
509
00:34:19,115 --> 00:34:19,855
It works.
510
00:34:20,095 --> 00:34:21,455
I can get a wallet for it.
511
00:34:21,515 --> 00:34:23,015
I can release a shitcoin tomorrow.
512
00:34:24,535 --> 00:34:32,435
So the argument that we're making it harder when the easiest possible thing works flawlessly.
513
00:34:33,915 --> 00:34:35,575
But the easiest thing is already easy.
514
00:34:35,755 --> 00:34:36,835
We're not making it more expensive.
515
00:34:37,615 --> 00:34:40,395
We have a really good protocol for shitcoins on Bitcoin.
516
00:34:41,075 --> 00:34:41,755
Nobody's using it.
517
00:34:41,755 --> 00:34:51,435
So the reason why people are coming up with new protocols for shitcoin on Bitcoin is, like you said originally, it doesn't matter that the old thing is cheaper, easier, faster and better.
518
00:34:51,715 --> 00:34:53,715
It matters that the new thing is new.
519
00:34:54,775 --> 00:34:56,555
And there will always be a new thing.
520
00:34:56,975 --> 00:35:02,555
And by blocking whatever the current new thing is, it isn't going to prevent someone else becoming a new thing.
521
00:35:02,895 --> 00:35:06,535
No, but it does send a clear signal that these things aren't welcome here at all.
522
00:35:06,535 --> 00:35:09,975
And I think that that signal does have value.
523
00:35:09,975 --> 00:35:12,095
Like you can't say it has zero value.
524
00:35:12,615 --> 00:35:16,335
So, and the main reason I like this soft fork
525
00:35:16,335 --> 00:35:17,455
is that it's temporary.
526
00:35:18,015 --> 00:35:20,035
So it's sure it's doing something.
527
00:35:20,175 --> 00:35:21,075
We'll see what happens,
528
00:35:21,215 --> 00:35:24,575
but at least it buys us some time to fix the exploit.
529
00:35:25,355 --> 00:35:28,135
If you're going to do a temporary soft fork,
530
00:35:28,855 --> 00:35:32,355
it should be focused and targeted
531
00:35:32,355 --> 00:35:36,415
to the most abusive spam on the network.
532
00:35:36,415 --> 00:35:39,415
And it should not be...
533
00:35:39,975 --> 00:35:44,195
a collection of popular ideas.
534
00:35:46,075 --> 00:35:48,935
And BIP-110 is really a collection of popular ideas
535
00:35:48,935 --> 00:35:53,695
because the minimal soft fork needed
536
00:35:53,695 --> 00:35:56,035
to invalidate the Ordinals protocol,
537
00:35:56,215 --> 00:35:58,235
which is the most abusive protocol right now,
538
00:35:58,295 --> 00:35:59,695
maybe the second one is runes.
539
00:36:00,175 --> 00:36:02,315
The minimal soft fork required,
540
00:36:02,875 --> 00:36:04,315
if that's what was up,
541
00:36:04,915 --> 00:36:07,075
I don't think anybody would even object to it
542
00:36:07,075 --> 00:36:09,395
except the Ordinals guys, which no one cares about.
543
00:36:09,395 --> 00:36:19,855
I think if somebody put up a minimal fork that said, oh, yeah, we're just going to restrict this one thing that nobody uses except ordinals, this other thing that nobody uses but ruins, we're done.
544
00:36:20,015 --> 00:36:20,355
We're going to move on.
545
00:36:20,715 --> 00:36:36,055
But instead, it's this broad and sweeping set of blocks on speculative things like capping op return, which is not used for spam in any significant way, or getting rid of op if, which is, again, not used for spam in any significant way.
546
00:36:36,055 --> 00:36:41,755
you can cap the size of arguments and prevent the ordinal's protocol from functioning you can cap
547
00:36:41,755 --> 00:36:46,035
runes and prevent the runes protocol from functioning and force them to hard fork their
548
00:36:46,035 --> 00:36:51,735
thing which by the way is very easy for them it's easy for them to evade it but once you've done
549
00:36:51,735 --> 00:36:57,835
that you've sent the signal without potentially damaging bitcoin's use as money and that's the
550
00:36:57,835 --> 00:37:02,995
thing that i have a problem with i think bip 110 potentially damages bitcoin's use as money
551
00:37:02,995 --> 00:37:09,615
and may also send a signal that mob rule is the way that development now occurs.
552
00:37:09,935 --> 00:37:19,115
Because it's pretty clear that exchanges and miners and big holders are not the main proponents behind it.
553
00:37:19,895 --> 00:37:23,115
So, you know, if it actually succeeded, it would be quite dangerous.
554
00:37:23,195 --> 00:37:24,455
I'm not worried about it succeeding.
555
00:37:25,095 --> 00:37:28,875
And I think in a way it's sort of like, see, we don't have to worry about it.
556
00:37:28,895 --> 00:37:29,875
But it is distracting.
557
00:37:30,275 --> 00:37:32,495
And there's some benefits to it.
558
00:37:32,495 --> 00:37:37,715
I do think it's refocusing the conversation on what it means to be a use as money.
559
00:37:37,855 --> 00:37:42,675
And I think it does make people more cautious about Bitcoinery on Bitcoin, which is good.
560
00:37:42,815 --> 00:37:47,675
I think the signal is valuable, even as it is, without even merging it.
561
00:37:48,075 --> 00:37:49,135
100% agree.
562
00:37:49,795 --> 00:37:49,975
Yeah.
563
00:37:51,255 --> 00:37:56,915
But I do think it could have been better designed and more targeted with a real chance at success,
564
00:37:56,915 --> 00:38:01,395
as opposed to this, no one's going to take this thing.
565
00:38:01,395 --> 00:38:06,615
especially the the miniscript destruction like why would you invalidate miniscripts that have
566
00:38:06,615 --> 00:38:10,895
been like yeah we're gonna only do it up to a certain date and this and that yeah but what if
567
00:38:10,895 --> 00:38:15,395
i have a pre-signed scripts people do pre-signed scripts months years in advance i mean there's
568
00:38:15,395 --> 00:38:23,095
protocols out there like it's just but what can't overdo it okay so so so so if miniscript is the
569
00:38:23,095 --> 00:38:28,415
most destructive thing in it it's probably the miniscript and also the the the um the capping
570
00:38:28,415 --> 00:38:34,435
opra turn at 80 bytes are both fairly destructive because there are inheritance protocols that use
571
00:38:34,435 --> 00:38:39,255
larger opra turns people are talking about quantum signature uh protocols but they're actually
572
00:38:39,255 --> 00:38:46,415
quantum vaults not actual signatures but vault inheritance protocols why are why how is that
573
00:38:46,415 --> 00:38:53,215
a monetary use case how is inheritance a monetary use case i mean you can just you can just write
574
00:38:53,215 --> 00:38:58,255
down your words and put it in a box somewhere and give it to your people like doing time lock
575
00:38:58,255 --> 00:39:02,615
things and stuff like that. Yeah, but okay, so this is what I have a problem with, because
576
00:39:02,615 --> 00:39:11,035
many of these use cases, and also, I'm curious, what monetary use case requires miniscripts that
577
00:39:11,035 --> 00:39:17,655
is time locked into somewhere in the middle of the fork period? Like, what monetary use case is that?
578
00:39:18,995 --> 00:39:26,155
I'm not going to say that I am the wizard on all the different monetary use cases of
579
00:39:26,155 --> 00:39:32,755
Miniscript. I will say that a friend of mine had developed an inheritance protocol in Wallet
580
00:39:32,755 --> 00:39:38,915
that uses it. Now he's staring down the barrel of it being potentially invalidated. He just
581
00:39:38,915 --> 00:39:46,275
stopped using Op-If, which is fine. You can stop using it. So the word got out that Op-If
582
00:39:46,275 --> 00:39:51,875
was on the chopping block and he just switched his software before it caused any damage.
583
00:39:52,735 --> 00:39:56,515
But regardless, that was the reason why I said inheritance protocols.
584
00:39:56,715 --> 00:39:58,495
It's because of my acting with doing that.
585
00:39:59,235 --> 00:40:03,575
Let me fill that in because I think that's a clear case of fiat around and find out.
586
00:40:03,575 --> 00:40:06,055
You're trying to do a fiat-y thing on Bitcoin.
587
00:40:06,895 --> 00:40:08,755
And there's no dollars involved.
588
00:40:08,915 --> 00:40:09,695
No, no, no, no, no.
589
00:40:09,795 --> 00:40:16,215
But I think inheritance post-hyper-Bitcoinization will look so different from how we do it now.
590
00:40:16,275 --> 00:40:18,535
And you don't need legal entities and whatnot.
591
00:40:19,335 --> 00:40:21,035
Regardless, my point.
592
00:40:21,035 --> 00:40:21,435
What about Bolt?
593
00:40:21,875 --> 00:40:23,235
I'm trying to get to a point.
594
00:40:23,435 --> 00:40:28,815
And the point is that the more fringe things you use Bitcoin for,
595
00:40:29,035 --> 00:40:32,695
the less purely monetary things you use Bitcoin for,
596
00:40:32,695 --> 00:40:38,495
the more at risk those transactions are because you can't really own a Bitcoin.
597
00:40:38,635 --> 00:40:43,155
It's always dependent on network consensus.
598
00:40:43,595 --> 00:40:44,735
It can change.
599
00:40:44,735 --> 00:40:54,895
And you know that things that are less popular are more at risk of being fought against in the future.
600
00:40:55,075 --> 00:41:00,715
So if you try, if you spam, maybe the cat will come and bump you on the head.
601
00:41:00,875 --> 00:41:03,255
And all of a sudden your NFT is useless.
602
00:41:03,495 --> 00:41:10,375
Like you're doing all this other more fuck around stuff at your own risk.
603
00:41:10,375 --> 00:41:20,395
And every user trying to do anything like that, even time locks are definitely included in that, should be aware.
604
00:41:20,935 --> 00:41:24,435
I'm certain of what's the oldest and most useful opcodes in Bitcoin if it wasn't for time locks.
605
00:41:24,435 --> 00:41:25,315
No, I love them.
606
00:41:25,415 --> 00:41:26,035
I love them.
607
00:41:26,155 --> 00:41:30,095
I have had so many great conversations about them and just what they enable.
608
00:41:30,355 --> 00:41:46,982
And I love Michael Dunworth thing where he sent a Bitcoin to 100 years into the future But the thing is Lightning is not an edge case no no no lightning is not an edge case uh but i say that that but it requires time long the the the fringier
609
00:41:46,982 --> 00:41:53,142
your your case your use case is the more at risk your coins are because like at the end of the day
610
00:41:53,142 --> 00:41:58,702
you don't really own your bitcoin all you all you do is like you control your private key meaning
611
00:41:58,702 --> 00:42:00,002
you know your private key.
612
00:42:00,262 --> 00:42:02,182
You know how to move the Bitcoin.
613
00:42:02,882 --> 00:42:06,462
And that allows you to act as if you own them.
614
00:42:06,962 --> 00:42:09,402
But the reason you can act as if you own them
615
00:42:09,402 --> 00:42:11,082
is because you find it improbable
616
00:42:11,082 --> 00:42:13,402
that the rules will change to such an extent
617
00:42:13,402 --> 00:42:15,202
that it will render them useless.
618
00:42:15,882 --> 00:42:17,162
And you also find it very...
619
00:42:17,162 --> 00:42:18,282
You could hate BIP-110.
620
00:42:19,962 --> 00:42:22,782
Yeah, and I would if it was a hard fork.
621
00:42:22,942 --> 00:42:26,202
I would if it was trying to do something...
622
00:42:26,202 --> 00:42:27,782
None of these other protocols are hard for us.
623
00:42:27,782 --> 00:42:35,122
I would if it wasn't temporary, but I like it because it's temporary and that could at least buy us some time to fix the problems.
624
00:42:35,122 --> 00:42:42,402
I don't think Bitcoin is for developers who want, mainly for developers who want to try new cool things.
625
00:42:42,582 --> 00:42:45,342
I like that's not the main use case.
626
00:42:45,742 --> 00:42:47,542
I don't really feel sorry for them.
627
00:42:48,022 --> 00:42:50,562
They will just have to adapt to what the users want.
628
00:42:51,802 --> 00:42:55,042
So, okay, I get it.
629
00:42:55,302 --> 00:42:57,642
I don't think Bitcoin is for developers either.
630
00:42:57,782 --> 00:43:03,062
I do think that I want Bitcoin.
631
00:43:03,402 --> 00:43:13,602
The only major things that I think Bitcoin, that I would desire on Bitcoin is privacy, because I don't think that that is a optional feature of money.
632
00:43:14,122 --> 00:43:15,802
I think fungibility is critical.
633
00:43:15,802 --> 00:43:27,462
And I think that, you know, watching people get arrested for providing privacy shows that the protocol needs to support it at a fundamental level.
634
00:43:27,782 --> 00:43:39,582
And that what we're doing now, which is, you know, this sort of fucking around on the side private is is worse than than modifying the core protocol to support privacy.
635
00:43:40,102 --> 00:43:43,202
We've created an edge case where there doesn't have to be one.
636
00:43:44,242 --> 00:43:45,402
I also think vaulting.
637
00:43:46,482 --> 00:43:50,642
Cold storage with recovery delays is not an edge case.
638
00:43:50,642 --> 00:44:02,362
I think it is a absolutely op vaults and op CTV together can provide this lovely feature where you can spend and there can be a delay and there can be a recovery path.
639
00:44:02,982 --> 00:44:06,602
And that sequence is, again, critical.
640
00:44:06,942 --> 00:44:11,322
I don't think it's an optional use case, especially as Bitcoin becomes, you know, hyper Bitcoinization.
641
00:44:11,662 --> 00:44:13,842
More and more people are going to be using it.
642
00:44:13,842 --> 00:44:23,722
The ability to have a vault-like system where, you know, you reduce the impact of a wrench attack and things like that are going to become more and more important.
643
00:44:23,942 --> 00:44:32,122
And finally, the main, the other big thing is the ability for what's called VTXOs, where not everybody has to have a UTXO.
644
00:44:32,662 --> 00:44:38,682
Where we don't blow up the UTXO set to, you know, 2 billion people have a UTXO.
645
00:44:38,862 --> 00:44:40,242
I don't think that's going to work.
646
00:44:40,882 --> 00:44:42,242
Yeah, I don't think that's going to work.
647
00:44:42,242 --> 00:44:43,722
And Lightning solves that.
648
00:44:43,842 --> 00:44:49,162
To a limited extent, it definitely expands the footprint of available Bitcoin usage.
649
00:44:49,382 --> 00:44:51,982
I use Lightning, I would say, almost every day.
650
00:44:52,402 --> 00:44:58,782
It's thank goodness for Lightning because it changed my ability to use Bitcoin.
651
00:44:59,082 --> 00:45:04,862
It changed my ability to just live most of my life on a Bitcoin standard, which I really, really love.
652
00:45:04,982 --> 00:45:06,002
I think that's critical.
653
00:45:06,222 --> 00:45:13,642
And it's not just because of fees and just because that's there's another really big thing is Bitcoin isn't just.
654
00:45:13,842 --> 00:45:14,982
It's part of a lifestyle.
655
00:45:15,822 --> 00:45:20,442
You're changing who you are as a person and how you interact with society.
656
00:45:21,622 --> 00:45:27,882
And for that to occur, using it every day is important.
657
00:45:28,062 --> 00:45:30,342
It's important for the Bitcoin culture.
658
00:45:31,042 --> 00:45:36,642
And as woo-woo as that sounds, I think it's almost more important than all the other things we're talking about.
659
00:45:36,642 --> 00:45:38,682
Like vaulting, whatever, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
660
00:45:38,682 --> 00:45:42,982
having it be part of your life, having it be something that you use every day,
661
00:45:43,382 --> 00:45:45,942
changes how you think about it, how you talk to people about it.
662
00:45:46,322 --> 00:45:51,062
You know, when I do business with China, which I do import goods from time to time,
663
00:45:51,722 --> 00:45:54,282
I always ask if they accept Bitcoin.
664
00:45:54,802 --> 00:46:00,222
And if two vendors say no and one vendor says yes, that's the vendor I choose.
665
00:46:00,722 --> 00:46:02,642
Now, that doesn't happen that often.
666
00:46:03,302 --> 00:46:05,162
But imagine if millions of people are doing this.
667
00:46:05,162 --> 00:46:08,982
This could really change what it means for Bitcoin to expand into the world.
668
00:46:09,382 --> 00:46:16,262
And so its use as money is important for growth, for getting people on board, for me being able to hold more.
669
00:46:16,382 --> 00:46:18,802
I can hold a lot more in coin if I can spend it.
670
00:46:19,002 --> 00:46:22,022
If I can't spend it, I have to keep fiat around just to pay my rent.
671
00:46:22,442 --> 00:46:24,482
But if I can spend it every day, I don't.
672
00:46:25,202 --> 00:46:28,162
No, I absolutely agree with all of the above.
673
00:46:28,962 --> 00:46:32,762
So I do think there's some changes that I don't believe in ossification today.
674
00:46:32,762 --> 00:46:33,642
I think it's not.
675
00:46:33,922 --> 00:46:35,522
I think the protocol is not finished.
676
00:46:36,222 --> 00:46:38,842
I don't think Bitcoin can ossify because.
677
00:46:39,202 --> 00:46:39,462
Yeah.
678
00:46:39,902 --> 00:46:41,042
Because the world changes.
679
00:46:41,742 --> 00:46:41,962
Yes.
680
00:46:42,022 --> 00:46:44,462
And the human beings change their wills.
681
00:46:44,562 --> 00:46:46,122
I mean, it's very hard to change it.
682
00:46:46,282 --> 00:46:50,822
But at the end of the day, it's human beings choosing stuff.
683
00:46:51,182 --> 00:46:53,162
That's backseat more than personal work.
684
00:46:53,182 --> 00:46:53,822
And I like the idea of blocking spam.
685
00:46:54,142 --> 00:46:54,522
I do.
686
00:46:54,882 --> 00:47:00,582
I like the idea of killing, but I just wish it was much more targeted, much more focused on the one thing.
687
00:47:00,582 --> 00:47:05,442
And there weren't all sorts of knock-on effects that I can't predict and no one can predict.
688
00:47:05,962 --> 00:47:09,002
So would you be pro the cat if that was ever implemented then?
689
00:47:09,542 --> 00:47:10,642
Because that's way more targeted.
690
00:47:10,642 --> 00:47:14,382
Again, I think the cat does the wrong thing.
691
00:47:14,922 --> 00:47:17,662
It seizes as opposed to...
692
00:47:17,662 --> 00:47:20,802
Now, Robin Linus proposed a simple solution to all of these problems.
693
00:47:21,402 --> 00:47:23,462
And very few people talk about it.
694
00:47:24,202 --> 00:47:25,202
The one simple solution.
695
00:47:25,202 --> 00:47:31,982
solution. If your dust transaction that encodes an image, you can see it's this giant transaction
696
00:47:31,982 --> 00:47:40,362
that consumes a very, has a very small UTXO size. So it's like a one Satoshi and 4K.
697
00:47:40,842 --> 00:47:48,482
That ratio matters, right? Imagine if we had a simple rule that said, based on that ratio
698
00:47:48,482 --> 00:47:50,402
and based on the age,
699
00:47:50,882 --> 00:47:54,562
we no longer need to store it on the blockchain.
700
00:47:55,222 --> 00:47:59,882
And instead, you are responsible for storing it.
701
00:48:00,882 --> 00:48:02,742
And if you want to spend it, go ahead.
702
00:48:02,922 --> 00:48:03,962
You can move it all you want.
703
00:48:04,522 --> 00:48:08,922
But you have to submit a Merkle proof back up to the root
704
00:48:08,922 --> 00:48:10,362
in order to spend it.
705
00:48:11,142 --> 00:48:12,802
It's an interesting protocol.
706
00:48:13,262 --> 00:48:16,322
Because now, if I store an image on the blockchain,
707
00:48:16,742 --> 00:48:18,282
it doesn't actually get stored on the blockchain.
708
00:48:18,282 --> 00:48:19,122
I have to store it.
709
00:48:19,702 --> 00:48:21,162
And then what the hell is the point?
710
00:48:21,362 --> 00:48:23,942
I might as well have just committed a hash to Op return for 80 bytes.
711
00:48:24,822 --> 00:48:25,782
It's just an idea.
712
00:48:26,022 --> 00:48:28,262
I don't know if it's fully worked out, fully fleshed out.
713
00:48:28,482 --> 00:48:37,562
But there are other ways we can solve these problems besides just deleting, confiscating people's coins.
714
00:48:37,742 --> 00:48:38,842
That's a terrible precedent.
715
00:48:39,402 --> 00:48:39,502
Yeah.
716
00:48:39,902 --> 00:48:44,222
And yes, I like the idea of the cat more than I like.
717
00:48:44,262 --> 00:48:47,702
I like to scare people with the cat more than the proposal itself.
718
00:48:47,702 --> 00:48:49,302
is not like really serious.
719
00:48:49,802 --> 00:48:50,682
It's a little dangerous.
720
00:48:50,862 --> 00:48:50,982
Yeah.
721
00:48:51,242 --> 00:48:51,522
Yeah.
722
00:48:51,702 --> 00:48:53,662
So, but I like the fact
723
00:48:53,662 --> 00:48:55,862
that it was even thought of
724
00:48:55,862 --> 00:48:57,222
because that in itself,
725
00:48:57,222 --> 00:48:59,302
I think had an effect on spam.
726
00:48:59,802 --> 00:49:00,402
I hope it did.
727
00:49:00,402 --> 00:49:01,142
Like if spammers, yeah.
728
00:49:01,602 --> 00:49:04,922
So whatever we can do to stop this,
729
00:49:04,962 --> 00:49:06,522
because I don't think people
730
00:49:06,522 --> 00:49:07,722
hate these people enough
731
00:49:07,722 --> 00:49:09,902
because they're storing shit forever
732
00:49:09,902 --> 00:49:11,402
on other people's machines.
733
00:49:11,682 --> 00:49:13,042
And it's not a good,
734
00:49:14,522 --> 00:49:16,722
it's the definition of a bad actor.
735
00:49:17,542 --> 00:49:17,662
Right.
736
00:49:17,702 --> 00:49:20,302
Being hostile to spam is a good thing.
737
00:49:20,722 --> 00:49:29,442
Targeted soft forks that are strict around arguments to opcodes are good for Bitcoin.
738
00:49:29,702 --> 00:49:35,482
I see no reason not to restrict the 520 byte limit in BIP 110 seems reasonable to almost everybody.
739
00:49:35,722 --> 00:49:39,982
I don't think anybody core and otherwise was like, probably we should have done that in the first place.
740
00:49:40,782 --> 00:49:45,962
So why don't we see any other actual proposals like the Robin Williams thing?
741
00:49:45,962 --> 00:49:48,082
Because I don't think anyone feels like it's urgent.
742
00:49:48,262 --> 00:49:56,322
I don't think anyone feels that spam is causing, you know, fees to rise or undue scrutiny.
743
00:49:56,882 --> 00:50:01,822
I don't think, I think there's a lot of, one of the biggest words you hear thrown around
744
00:50:01,822 --> 00:50:02,962
core is the word urgent.
745
00:50:03,442 --> 00:50:04,062
Is it urgent?
746
00:50:04,062 --> 00:50:09,882
I remember when OpsiTV was proposed, it's probably the simplest covenant, least powerful,
747
00:50:10,382 --> 00:50:11,302
non-recursive.
748
00:50:11,742 --> 00:50:15,662
All it says is, here's the shape of the transaction that I'm committing to.
749
00:50:15,962 --> 00:50:22,362
hash it, include that hash, and then validate that anything I spend has to match that hash.
750
00:50:22,702 --> 00:50:26,722
It's a very straightforward thing. Most people can understand it in very few words.
751
00:50:27,702 --> 00:50:32,622
Now that, and also it's like 30 lines of code. So it's like, there's like no footprint risk.
752
00:50:32,622 --> 00:50:38,562
It's like, it's like the smallest, littlest thing. And then there's this, all this discussion.
753
00:50:38,702 --> 00:50:43,582
Why is it so urgent? Why do you have to do it today? It's been seven years. There's no urgency.
754
00:50:43,582 --> 00:50:45,682
nobody said like we have to do it tomorrow
755
00:50:45,682 --> 00:50:47,902
we're just like you know people who are
756
00:50:47,902 --> 00:50:49,722
advocates for CTV are like you know
757
00:50:49,722 --> 00:50:51,902
it would be nice if we could build vaulting
758
00:50:51,902 --> 00:50:53,842
protocols it would be nice if we could build
759
00:50:53,842 --> 00:50:55,842
you know ball lightning where we could onboard
760
00:50:55,842 --> 00:50:57,522
lots and lots of people into lightning
761
00:50:57,522 --> 00:50:59,582
instead of having all these custodial solutions
762
00:50:59,582 --> 00:51:01,782
you know those would be really cool to build
763
00:51:01,782 --> 00:51:03,602
and a lot of people have built
764
00:51:03,602 --> 00:51:06,002
whole wallets
765
00:51:06,002 --> 00:51:07,922
that are just sitting on Cignet
766
00:51:07,922 --> 00:51:08,822
forever now
767
00:51:08,822 --> 00:51:10,042
yeah yeah but
768
00:51:10,042 --> 00:51:13,562
hoping that some of these things happen
769
00:51:13,562 --> 00:51:18,502
to devil's advocate that that's one of my favorite features of bitcoin is that it's so
770
00:51:18,502 --> 00:51:24,162
resistant to change and i think when it actually does change it does come with unforeseen consequence
771
00:51:24,162 --> 00:51:31,002
taproot is the best example of that and in hindsight i think yeah and it was rushed like it
772
00:51:31,002 --> 00:51:37,002
should it shouldn't have been put there because it was abused and now it has sort of the opposite
773
00:51:37,002 --> 00:51:39,002
effect. Do you know why I like
774
00:51:39,002 --> 00:51:40,902
Taproot? Was because
775
00:51:40,902 --> 00:51:42,502
it was actually two changes.
776
00:51:43,022 --> 00:51:44,962
It was one change that I wanted
777
00:51:44,962 --> 00:51:46,742
and one change I didn't care about.
778
00:51:47,642 --> 00:51:48,922
The change I wanted
779
00:51:48,922 --> 00:51:50,722
was Schnorr signatures so that I could do
780
00:51:50,722 --> 00:51:53,002
multi-sig signatures
781
00:51:53,002 --> 00:51:55,002
that were untraceable. I love
782
00:51:55,002 --> 00:51:57,002
that. I was like, I can have any
783
00:51:57,002 --> 00:51:58,962
number of signatories and you don't get
784
00:51:58,962 --> 00:52:00,942
to know what they are. I love that.
785
00:52:01,022 --> 00:52:03,262
That was a great protocol and we used it
786
00:52:03,262 --> 00:52:04,722
immediately at my company.
787
00:52:04,722 --> 00:52:07,062
immediately.
788
00:52:07,362 --> 00:52:09,162
We used, you know, it's like multi-sig.
789
00:52:09,422 --> 00:52:10,562
That's how we custody stuff.
790
00:52:11,142 --> 00:52:13,122
I did work for a Bitcoin custody company.
791
00:52:14,262 --> 00:52:15,222
Which one?
792
00:52:15,502 --> 00:52:16,982
You don't want to disclose that?
793
00:52:17,382 --> 00:52:19,282
I don't want to disclose it because there's a lawsuit going on.
794
00:52:19,282 --> 00:52:19,902
No problem.
795
00:52:21,302 --> 00:52:23,502
But, yeah, it's a great protocol.
796
00:52:23,502 --> 00:52:29,502
It really helps reduce the ability for someone to analyze,
797
00:52:30,402 --> 00:52:33,302
to chain analyze your custody solutions.
798
00:52:33,502 --> 00:52:34,442
That's Schnorr signatures.
799
00:52:34,722 --> 00:52:37,282
Schnorr signatures could have been done all by themselves.
800
00:52:37,682 --> 00:52:39,102
There's no reason to include Tapscript.
801
00:52:39,862 --> 00:52:41,722
Tapscript is a whole other thing.
802
00:52:41,942 --> 00:52:42,902
Huge footprint.
803
00:52:43,702 --> 00:52:45,322
Lots and lots and lots of things.
804
00:52:45,982 --> 00:52:49,102
Schnorr sigs are like proven secure,
805
00:52:50,062 --> 00:52:54,542
cryptographically sound constructions
806
00:52:54,542 --> 00:52:56,242
that everyone can nod their heads and say,
807
00:52:56,622 --> 00:52:59,062
other than the exposed public key, this is good.
808
00:52:59,862 --> 00:53:00,042
Right?
809
00:53:00,502 --> 00:53:01,482
That's true.
810
00:53:01,702 --> 00:53:03,202
Other than the exposed public key, it's good.
811
00:53:03,202 --> 00:53:08,242
And exposed public keys are arguably, if you construct them correctly, they shouldn't be too bad.
812
00:53:08,942 --> 00:53:10,222
Then we can talk about quantum stuff.
813
00:53:10,402 --> 00:53:12,342
But regardless, that was the whole thing about Schnorr.
814
00:53:12,822 --> 00:53:19,882
The Tapscript, lots and lots of new codes to look at, potential attack surfaces, and we've seen it being abused repeatedly.
815
00:53:20,702 --> 00:53:25,922
I would say there's more abuse of Tapscript than use of it right now.
816
00:53:25,922 --> 00:53:31,982
And since it's been merged, I think I wouldn't have to look on the blockchain to count, but
817
00:53:31,982 --> 00:53:37,502
I would imagine that you and I would both agree that there's far more abuse of Tapscript
818
00:53:37,502 --> 00:53:39,102
than use of Tapscript.
819
00:53:40,002 --> 00:53:40,342
Absolutely.
820
00:53:41,562 --> 00:53:45,502
I think exchanges are benefiting from some use of it.
821
00:53:45,702 --> 00:53:51,962
I do think they do some broadcast transaction things, like when they're doing maybe pools,
822
00:53:51,962 --> 00:53:55,682
use them for payouts, or there's like some edge case things that are like, oh,
823
00:53:55,922 --> 00:53:56,442
They're useful.
824
00:53:56,922 --> 00:54:00,862
But if you were to add those up, they would be like 2% of the transactions.
825
00:54:01,402 --> 00:54:05,342
98% is just people abusing Tabscript to do dumb things that are useless.
826
00:54:07,462 --> 00:54:08,942
So, yeah, I agree.
827
00:54:09,362 --> 00:54:13,142
We definitely have to be careful about changes.
828
00:54:13,922 --> 00:54:15,842
Abuse is a real concern.
829
00:54:17,102 --> 00:54:22,062
That's one of the reasons why I'm a fan of CTV over TX hash, which is more expressive,
830
00:54:22,062 --> 00:54:27,422
or CCV, coin control, which is really, really good for fee management in these protocols.
831
00:54:28,462 --> 00:54:37,722
Don't care. I think it's the safest, smallest. Dip your toe in the water and get some scalability
832
00:54:37,722 --> 00:54:47,402
and vaulting and protocols that allow people to develop broader retail use of Bitcoin on a day-to-day
833
00:54:47,402 --> 00:54:53,182
basis without making too much of a fuss. And that's why the other thing I'm a fan of is MWeb,
834
00:54:53,302 --> 00:54:56,762
Mimblewimble, because I think privacy is important. And everyone's like, well,
835
00:54:56,822 --> 00:55:02,102
Mimblewimble isn't perfectly private. I'm like, I don't care. Neither is CoinJoin. I don't need a
836
00:55:02,102 --> 00:55:07,362
perfect... That's why CTV isn't a perfect covenant. It's really simple. It's limited. It sucks in many
837
00:55:07,362 --> 00:55:12,862
ways. Great. I don't want one that's super powerful. Same with Mimblewimble. It's like,
838
00:55:12,862 --> 00:55:15,262
Oh, it's limited, it's problematic
839
00:55:15,262 --> 00:55:17,682
It's simple, it's provable
840
00:55:17,682 --> 00:55:19,822
Those are the things that matter to me
841
00:55:19,822 --> 00:55:21,062
When it comes to a Bitcoin change
842
00:55:21,062 --> 00:55:23,642
I want simple, provable, small
843
00:55:23,642 --> 00:55:26,262
And I want it to be as restricted
844
00:55:26,262 --> 00:55:27,642
And bounded as possible
845
00:55:27,642 --> 00:55:29,582
So it can't be exploited by people
846
00:55:29,582 --> 00:55:30,582
Who are exploiting things
847
00:55:30,582 --> 00:55:33,302
That's why I like Schnorr
848
00:55:32,989 --> 00:55:34,749
And I don't like Tapscript that much.
849
00:55:34,909 --> 00:55:41,209
I think Tapscript could have taken another two years of development to get the attack service down before it was merged.
850
00:55:41,349 --> 00:55:42,769
I think that would have been the wiser choice.
851
00:55:42,769 --> 00:55:44,649
But that's BIP-110, isn't it?
852
00:55:45,009 --> 00:55:46,769
Like it's postponing it for two years.
853
00:55:47,089 --> 00:55:47,669
I wish.
854
00:55:47,789 --> 00:55:54,929
I wish BIP-110 was just, you know, reducing opcode sizes and things like that.
855
00:55:55,009 --> 00:56:01,189
But it has this populist, you know, hard restrict op return, which I don't think is useful for the protocol.
856
00:56:01,189 --> 00:56:05,949
and I think is potentially restricting use as money in ways that I don't like.
857
00:56:06,689 --> 00:56:10,829
So when is a non-pratern above 83 bytes legit?
858
00:56:12,029 --> 00:56:18,049
So I think it was 160 bytes is the size of HTLC commitment.
859
00:56:18,309 --> 00:56:19,089
I think that was the limit.
860
00:56:19,109 --> 00:56:21,269
What is that? HTLC commitment?
861
00:56:21,269 --> 00:56:29,749
like a way of saying um i i don't know all the details of moon's uh of moon's uh protocol for
862
00:56:29,749 --> 00:56:37,589
for inheritance and uh his extension into bolts but it it i believe 160 bytes was the limit
863
00:56:37,589 --> 00:56:43,269
that he talked about what he needed um and what he was using and then you know most of these people
864
00:56:43,269 --> 00:56:47,549
who are doing these experimental protocols are doing them on the you know because libre relay
865
00:56:47,549 --> 00:56:54,069
exists and these other relay networks exist. And that's how subsets exist. Otherwise, subsets would
866
00:56:54,069 --> 00:56:59,109
never really get mined. All of this stuff, I mean, policy, people don't understand what the
867
00:56:59,109 --> 00:57:03,749
difference between policy and consensus is for the most part, but policy is there to protect the nodes
868
00:57:03,749 --> 00:57:11,329
from attacks. And consensus is there to say what miners can mine. And policy is not there to say
869
00:57:11,329 --> 00:57:17,529
what miners can mine. It never was. Miners can mine anything they want. But we know that certain
870
00:57:17,529 --> 00:57:21,969
transactions can be a burden on notes. And if you want to mine those, you submit them directly to
871
00:57:21,969 --> 00:57:27,829
the miners. Go ahead. You know, there's, that was how it was. Then what happened is people started
872
00:57:27,829 --> 00:57:34,209
mining a crap ton of stuff that was a one-off experiment. Fine. You're developing some new
873
00:57:34,209 --> 00:57:40,149
thing. Maybe you'll, you'll submit a BIP. Go ahead. No one cares. But over time, people started
874
00:57:40,149 --> 00:57:46,749
submitting more and more and more out of policy transactions, especially the sub-Satoshi transactions,
875
00:57:46,749 --> 00:57:52,249
which were big, and 160-byte op returns started growing as well.
876
00:57:52,629 --> 00:57:55,869
And so then they were like, oh, we should just uncap it.
877
00:57:56,149 --> 00:57:59,849
And I think that was a big mistake because they had a strong use case for 160.
878
00:58:00,449 --> 00:58:01,889
Why one byte more?
879
00:58:02,229 --> 00:58:04,189
Like, oh, we might have to raise it again later.
880
00:58:04,309 --> 00:58:04,709
So what?
881
00:58:05,229 --> 00:58:06,289
Go ahead, raise it again later.
882
00:58:06,329 --> 00:58:06,809
It's policy.
883
00:58:06,909 --> 00:58:07,249
You can.
884
00:58:07,909 --> 00:58:13,029
So there was no, in my opinion, there was no legitimate reason for raising it beyond
885
00:58:13,029 --> 00:58:14,829
what they were observing on the network.
886
00:58:14,829 --> 00:58:28,289
The purpose of policy is you observe what's happening in the miners, and then you make sure the nodes mirror that so that they are insulated as possible from rogue transactions, and their mempool is as accurate as possible.
887
00:58:28,429 --> 00:58:31,849
So you have to observe what miners are doing and make policy match.
888
00:58:32,289 --> 00:58:43,209
And so policy always has to be flexible, because if policy is too strict, then the nodes are out of sync with the miners, and you get terrible inefficiencies, fee estimate and bandwidth inefficiency.
889
00:58:43,409 --> 00:58:44,189
Bandwidth is a demon.
890
00:58:44,189 --> 00:58:53,309
If policies are too loose, then you get the opposite problem, which is actually even worse, where transactions get relayed that never get mined.
891
00:58:53,749 --> 00:58:55,569
And now you have an open protocol for communications.
892
00:58:55,789 --> 00:58:56,569
That's really bad.
893
00:58:56,809 --> 00:58:58,309
You can't have policies be too loose.
894
00:58:59,149 --> 00:59:02,749
Transactions that get relayed should be valid candidates for mining.
895
00:59:03,829 --> 00:59:11,949
And vice versa, all validates for mining should be transactions that get relayed, or at least most.
896
00:59:11,949 --> 00:59:19,589
so so you definitely want you know whatever 99 or more of the transactions that will get mined
897
00:59:19,589 --> 00:59:24,909
should be within policy um and and so that's stewardship that has to change on a regular
898
00:59:24,909 --> 00:59:29,829
basis policy needs to keep moving as the mining landscape changes as usage changes as protocols
899
00:59:29,829 --> 00:59:36,549
change policy has to be flexible um consensus should be incredibly hard to change um take a
900
00:59:36,549 --> 00:59:41,889
really long time people argue about it um and i am don't know anybody who's serious about bitcoin
901
00:59:41,889 --> 00:59:42,749
that has a problem with that.
902
00:59:42,949 --> 00:59:44,629
So anyone who's whining about consensus
903
00:59:44,629 --> 00:59:45,649
being hard to change
904
00:59:45,649 --> 00:59:48,789
doesn't know Bitcoin at all, right?
905
00:59:48,849 --> 00:59:50,329
Like if you're an OpsiTV guy
906
00:59:50,329 --> 00:59:51,769
and you're like, yeah, I love OpsiTV.
907
00:59:52,009 --> 00:59:53,329
I am, I love it, I think it's great.
908
00:59:53,749 --> 00:59:55,529
I don't see, I haven't seen
909
00:59:55,529 --> 00:59:57,749
any legitimate technical arguments against it,
910
00:59:57,969 --> 01:00:00,309
even incentive arguments, not one.
911
01:00:00,629 --> 01:00:01,629
And I don't think anybody has.
912
01:00:01,709 --> 01:00:03,109
The main argument against it was,
913
01:00:03,169 --> 01:00:03,849
it was rushed.
914
01:00:04,669 --> 01:00:06,609
Fine, that's a good enough argument for me.
915
01:00:06,869 --> 01:00:07,929
I don't care.
916
01:00:08,789 --> 01:00:11,789
As long as it's still in play
917
01:00:11,789 --> 01:00:13,869
and people are still experimenting and fuzz testing
918
01:00:13,869 --> 01:00:15,209
and more proof is being provided,
919
01:00:15,529 --> 01:00:17,429
eventually that burden of proof will be exceeded
920
01:00:17,429 --> 01:00:20,869
and this tiny little obcode might one day get merged.
921
01:00:21,049 --> 01:00:22,309
That's how consensus should work.
922
01:00:23,229 --> 01:00:26,229
BIP 110, massive consensus change.
923
01:00:26,889 --> 01:00:29,309
All sorts of unpredictable knock-on effects
924
01:00:29,309 --> 01:00:30,529
I can't even talk about.
925
01:00:31,389 --> 01:00:35,329
The temporariness of it is, you know,
926
01:00:35,489 --> 01:00:37,569
a nice feature, I guess,
927
01:00:37,649 --> 01:00:39,609
because that way, if there really was any harm,
928
01:00:39,669 --> 01:00:40,609
we can find out about it.
929
01:00:40,609 --> 01:00:43,889
But then by then it's too late because then all those people don't trust Bitcoin anymore.
930
01:00:44,009 --> 01:00:45,149
And maybe those people are important.
931
01:00:45,289 --> 01:00:45,769
I don't know.
932
01:00:46,109 --> 01:00:49,909
I just don't know if BIP110 doesn't feel safe to me.
933
01:00:50,389 --> 01:00:54,109
But I don't think it feels very safe to anyone who's holding Bitcoin.
934
01:00:54,729 --> 01:01:06,309
So let's say when is it in August sometime that it's enforced by this segment, or if enforced is even the right word.
935
01:01:06,309 --> 01:01:12,289
after that if you're a miner and you mine compliant BIP110 compliant blocks
936
01:01:12,289 --> 01:01:14,809
I'm paraphrasing the theory here
937
01:01:14,809 --> 01:01:17,829
but if you mine the compliant blocks
938
01:01:17,829 --> 01:01:21,869
then you're at no risk whatsoever of losing
939
01:01:21,869 --> 01:01:27,829
because the rest of the network will build on those
940
01:01:27,829 --> 01:01:32,049
so who will be the first miner to mine a non-compliant block
941
01:01:32,049 --> 01:01:34,749
and what are their incentives to do that
942
01:01:34,749 --> 01:01:37,369
Is it just someone trolling?
943
01:01:37,369 --> 01:01:39,009
I don't think miners care.
944
01:01:39,949 --> 01:01:44,089
I think you underestimate how lazy most miners are.
945
01:01:44,289 --> 01:01:47,589
I was a miner for a long time with a significant amount of hash power,
946
01:01:48,269 --> 01:01:51,929
and I don't think I would have updated my software
947
01:01:51,929 --> 01:01:54,869
unless I felt like it was really, really worth it.
948
01:01:55,129 --> 01:01:58,089
And I would have just seen what happens.
949
01:01:58,449 --> 01:01:59,609
What's the worst that can happen?
950
01:02:00,269 --> 01:02:03,089
I'll switch to the new version in an hour.
951
01:02:03,089 --> 01:02:10,909
I think what will happen is some lazy miner who didn't update his software, which probably is many.
952
01:02:11,509 --> 01:02:13,109
Let's assume you're right.
953
01:02:13,389 --> 01:02:15,249
And 80% of the miners update their software.
954
01:02:15,909 --> 01:02:18,289
That means within an hour, we will see the first block.
955
01:02:19,229 --> 01:02:20,409
That doesn't, right?
956
01:02:20,889 --> 01:02:31,214
That doesn And then the question is have the rest of those miners updated their software to refuse to build on it Or have they updated their software to not refuse to build on it
957
01:02:31,334 --> 01:02:32,474
And we won't find that out
958
01:02:32,474 --> 01:02:35,154
until the first non-BIP-110 block is mined.
959
01:02:35,614 --> 01:02:37,794
My suspicion is someone's gonna mine
960
01:02:37,794 --> 01:02:39,594
a BIP-110 non-compliant block.
961
01:02:40,394 --> 01:02:43,454
People are gonna build on it and nobody will care
962
01:02:43,454 --> 01:02:46,854
because all the BIP-110 compliant miners will just,
963
01:02:47,154 --> 01:02:50,014
if there are any BIP-110 compliant miners at that point,
964
01:02:50,574 --> 01:02:52,174
Any blocks they build will be invalid.
965
01:02:52,434 --> 01:02:55,534
So, you know, there is a very big risk for BIP-110 miners.
966
01:02:56,374 --> 01:03:02,714
The moment a non-compliant block is built and then something is built upon it, they become out of compliance if they don't build upon it.
967
01:03:02,834 --> 01:03:06,434
And so people who are claiming there's no risk don't understand how mining works.
968
01:03:06,434 --> 01:03:10,574
But isn't the risk much bigger the other way around?
969
01:03:10,874 --> 01:03:11,934
No, it's about the same.
970
01:03:12,194 --> 01:03:13,514
It's a 10-minute difference.
971
01:03:14,174 --> 01:03:18,734
But all BIP-110 compliant blocks are also compliant with everything else.
972
01:03:18,734 --> 01:03:20,674
Like there's no risk there.
973
01:03:21,114 --> 01:03:26,554
But especially if you're a big pool, you have more to lose.
974
01:03:27,154 --> 01:03:28,534
So you might as well do that.
975
01:03:28,874 --> 01:03:30,294
It's not that there's no risk.
976
01:03:30,574 --> 01:03:34,134
There is risk if you're enforcing not building on the other block, right?
977
01:03:34,674 --> 01:03:37,234
So you have the same risk as everybody else.
978
01:03:37,254 --> 01:03:38,894
Well, it's not really enforcing.
979
01:03:39,054 --> 01:03:42,754
It's just I'm choosing to mine this block that follows these rules.
980
01:03:42,754 --> 01:03:42,814
No, no, no.
981
01:03:43,174 --> 01:03:46,774
It's different because, okay, I'm going to give you a chain.
982
01:03:46,874 --> 01:03:46,994
Ready?
983
01:03:47,194 --> 01:03:48,554
Block A comes along.
984
01:03:48,554 --> 01:03:50,634
It's BIP-110 compliant. Everybody's happy.
985
01:03:51,194 --> 01:03:53,914
Block B comes along. It's not compliant.
986
01:03:54,474 --> 01:03:56,574
Some people are happy. Some people aren't.
987
01:03:56,994 --> 01:03:59,214
Okay. Block C comes along.
988
01:03:59,594 --> 01:04:02,514
Does it refer to block B or does it refer to block A?
989
01:04:03,994 --> 01:04:04,514
Question.
990
01:04:05,414 --> 01:04:08,474
All the BIP-110 compliant miners will be pointing at block A.
991
01:04:09,194 --> 01:04:11,994
All the non-BIP-110 will be pointing at block B.
992
01:04:12,054 --> 01:04:12,814
Pointing at B, yeah.
993
01:04:13,534 --> 01:04:14,634
So now here's the fork.
994
01:04:14,634 --> 01:04:22,874
if there are more BIP-110 compliant minors than there are non-BIP-110 compliant minors,
995
01:04:22,874 --> 01:04:27,934
then the BIP-110 compliant minors become the majority chain. This chain splits. If there are
996
01:04:27,934 --> 01:04:35,134
more non-BIP-110 compliant minors than BIP-110 compliant minors, then it splits. No matter what,
997
01:04:35,394 --> 01:04:43,014
it splits. There's no safety in choosing to enforce that pointer at A. Now, what you can say as a
998
01:04:43,014 --> 01:04:45,194
miner is, I'm willing to mine
999
01:04:45,194 --> 01:04:47,094
only BIP-110 compliant blocks.
1000
01:04:47,694 --> 01:04:49,134
Yes, this is what I'm talking about.
1001
01:04:49,154 --> 01:04:50,554
But also, I'm not going to do enforcement.
1002
01:04:51,074 --> 01:04:52,994
No, exactly. I'm always going to point at me.
1003
01:04:53,574 --> 01:04:55,114
Yeah, that's what I'm...
1004
01:04:55,114 --> 01:04:56,374
That's a really good idea.
1005
01:04:56,974 --> 01:04:58,434
You should release the source code for that.
1006
01:04:59,214 --> 01:05:00,894
That's what I'm talking about, because if...
1007
01:05:00,894 --> 01:05:03,034
But nobody does this. There is no code
1008
01:05:03,034 --> 01:05:04,794
that does this. There's no
1009
01:05:04,794 --> 01:05:07,014
version of BIP-110 compliance
1010
01:05:07,014 --> 01:05:08,934
that is willing to accept
1011
01:05:08,934 --> 01:05:10,134
non-compliant blocks. No, no, no. Okay, okay.
1012
01:05:10,854 --> 01:05:12,994
So, if I'm a miner...
1013
01:05:12,994 --> 01:05:16,074
Well, there's no code involved.
1014
01:05:16,234 --> 01:05:18,914
I just choose to mine a compliant block.
1015
01:05:19,674 --> 01:05:25,314
And if I win, then that gets added to the blockchain.
1016
01:05:25,634 --> 01:05:28,694
And there's no reason whatsoever for me not to do that.
1017
01:05:29,014 --> 01:05:32,274
Because the risk is in mining a non-compliant block.
1018
01:05:32,534 --> 01:05:38,294
So from the perspective of the individual miner and the next block,
1019
01:05:38,734 --> 01:05:41,394
there is no risk at all to mining a compliant block.
1020
01:05:41,394 --> 01:05:46,454
but now you've got to it's not about the next block it's about which block you're pointing to
1021
01:05:46,454 --> 01:05:52,514
because that gets hashed into your block your block has to contain that pointer and so if you
1022
01:05:52,514 --> 01:05:58,514
don't contain that pointer and it's not pointing at the right thing no no no but what that's that's
1023
01:05:58,514 --> 01:06:04,694
within my argument because that only happens once the first non-compliant block has been mined
1024
01:06:04,694 --> 01:06:06,914
So there is no risk
1025
01:06:06,914 --> 01:06:09,414
So this is the thing
1026
01:06:09,414 --> 01:06:11,654
There's a perpetual no risk
1027
01:06:11,654 --> 01:06:13,734
Action to take
1028
01:06:13,734 --> 01:06:15,454
And that is always
1029
01:06:15,454 --> 01:06:16,754
Mining compliant blocks
1030
01:06:16,754 --> 01:06:19,214
Until there's a change
1031
01:06:19,214 --> 01:06:21,234
Until the first non-compliant block is mine
1032
01:06:21,234 --> 01:06:23,434
But no miner is ever
1033
01:06:23,434 --> 01:06:25,114
Incentivized to mine that first block
1034
01:06:25,114 --> 01:06:25,794
It doesn't matter
1035
01:06:25,794 --> 01:06:27,954
Because that's not
1036
01:06:27,954 --> 01:06:29,354
Mining works like this
1037
01:06:29,354 --> 01:06:32,734
Even if 10% of the miners
1038
01:06:32,734 --> 01:06:34,314
Choose to ignore
1039
01:06:34,314 --> 01:06:40,354
the protocol, one of them may mine that block. And then once they do, now there's risk.
1040
01:06:41,014 --> 01:06:46,294
So it doesn't matter. Once a miner mines that block, the risk happens. And now everyone has
1041
01:06:46,294 --> 01:06:52,494
to decide. Am I the kind of miner that mines BIP-110 compliant blocks that point to A or B?
1042
01:06:53,554 --> 01:06:59,794
I still mine BIP-110 compliant blocks. I'm being safe. But am I a B miner or I am an A miner?
1043
01:06:59,794 --> 01:07:04,694
Personally, if I were a miner, I would choose just pointing to the most recent one.
1044
01:07:04,954 --> 01:07:08,414
I would mine compliant blocks because, hey, it makes people happy.
1045
01:07:08,934 --> 01:07:13,574
And I would not enforce it because there's zero risk in that.
1046
01:07:13,954 --> 01:07:16,054
I'm always pointing the biggest proof of work.
1047
01:07:16,494 --> 01:07:17,994
The protocol has always worked that way.
1048
01:07:18,334 --> 01:07:19,814
Someone mines a noncompliant block.
1049
01:07:20,174 --> 01:07:20,654
I let them.
1050
01:07:21,274 --> 01:07:25,554
I remain compliant and I point to the most.
1051
01:07:25,554 --> 01:07:32,974
okay for a stupid pleb non-technical question here if if this is the case if if if miners
1052
01:07:32,974 --> 01:07:38,114
choose to do what you're describing which is even though even if there is one non-compliant blocks
1053
01:07:38,114 --> 01:07:45,274
you're still going to continue to mine compliant blocks because less why not why not why not and
1054
01:07:45,274 --> 01:07:50,034
then make people happy no one has to yell at me yeah but the thing is that then then the soft
1055
01:07:50,034 --> 01:07:56,074
work is not implemented from a technical perspective, but it still has the intended
1056
01:07:56,074 --> 01:08:03,014
effect. I like it. No argument for that. I have no argument with that. So if that's the case,
1057
01:08:03,014 --> 01:08:08,174
then what's the risk with BIP-110? Because BIP-110 doesn't do that. BIP-110
1058
01:08:08,174 --> 01:08:15,034
requires enforcement of the prior block. It forces you to ignore the longest proof of work chain.
1059
01:08:15,034 --> 01:08:20,774
BIP 110 says, let's say 10 blocks in a row are not compliant.
1060
01:08:21,374 --> 01:08:23,914
And the longest work chain is much, much bigger.
1061
01:08:24,234 --> 01:08:30,274
BIP 110 says, ignore all 10 of them and continue to point at the last compliant block.
1062
01:08:30,614 --> 01:08:39,154
Yes, and that might be enough for people to only mine spammy blocks every now and then and then keep being compliant.
1063
01:08:39,174 --> 01:08:41,674
No, once you mine a spammy block, the entire chain is split.
1064
01:08:42,014 --> 01:08:42,894
You can't do it every now and then.
1065
01:08:42,894 --> 01:08:43,474
I know, I know.
1066
01:08:43,714 --> 01:08:44,254
No, no, no.
1067
01:08:44,254 --> 01:08:53,714
I know, but you just said that after the non-compliant block is mined, you're not going to switch back to mining non-compliant.
1068
01:08:53,794 --> 01:08:55,874
You're still going to just to please people.
1069
01:08:56,634 --> 01:08:57,414
Of course.
1070
01:08:57,534 --> 01:09:01,734
Because the individual miner mine compliant blocks on top of a...
1071
01:09:01,734 --> 01:09:03,094
Right, but that software doesn't exist.
1072
01:09:03,514 --> 01:09:12,454
I would like to do that, but I would have to fork BIP-110, remove the enforcement, but leave the compliance, and then use that.
1073
01:09:12,454 --> 01:09:25,038
So this is perfect because this is the call to action of this particular podcast Write that code Yeah because then your argument would make sense
1074
01:09:25,158 --> 01:09:31,198
Then it would be like, why not mine blocks that don't have spam in them?
1075
01:09:31,638 --> 01:09:40,158
Why not mine blocks that are improving the monetary use case and sending a strong signal to spammers that we don't want your crap?
1076
01:09:40,158 --> 01:09:46,558
why not have that there's no reason why people wouldn't do that you don't benefit a lot from spam
1077
01:09:46,558 --> 01:09:53,298
as a minor um at least not today not these days um um there was a time back when you know 2022
1078
01:09:53,298 --> 01:09:59,858
when i noticed my revenue going up way a lot and that was the peak of ordinals i was like wow no
1079
01:09:59,858 --> 01:10:08,018
no february 2023 right isn't it 2023 yeah yeah it was um yeah it was i watched my revenue go up by
1080
01:10:08,018 --> 01:10:13,518
20 and 30 percent um and it was and the amazing thing was this is that at the time i was really
1081
01:10:13,518 --> 01:10:18,138
considering turning my miners off and just being like oh it's not profitable i'm gonna sell them
1082
01:10:18,138 --> 01:10:23,638
and then suddenly i'm like now i'm profitable again um and so i left them on probably i would
1083
01:10:23,638 --> 01:10:29,558
say for another three to six months simply because of ordinals and it's it's so wonderful because
1084
01:10:29,558 --> 01:10:35,538
the osho meme comes to mind instantly it's because people are retarded that's why we were making more
1085
01:10:35,538 --> 01:10:37,818
money because they were falling for these scams, right?
1086
01:10:37,838 --> 01:10:38,298
That's right.
1087
01:10:38,678 --> 01:10:38,998
That's right.
1088
01:10:39,958 --> 01:10:45,018
Just because you hate what people are doing with Bitcoin doesn't mean you shouldn't allow
1089
01:10:45,018 --> 01:10:45,258
it.
1090
01:10:45,898 --> 01:10:46,178
No, no.
1091
01:10:46,958 --> 01:10:52,558
That's not, that's, we don't have, that's, Bitcoin's protocol is specifically, you know,
1092
01:10:53,258 --> 01:10:57,098
designed so that people who do things you don't like can still use it.
1093
01:10:58,118 --> 01:11:02,598
Yeah, but this is, this is where I always bring this up in these debates.
1094
01:11:02,598 --> 01:11:07,618
This is where the South Park episode, The Death Camp of Tolerance, comes to mind.
1095
01:11:08,198 --> 01:11:12,898
And that episode is focused on the difference between approval and tolerance.
1096
01:11:13,158 --> 01:11:17,878
So you can tolerate stuff that you don't necessarily approve of.
1097
01:11:18,378 --> 01:11:18,858
Yes.
1098
01:11:19,338 --> 01:11:22,238
And that is what filters are, for instance.
1099
01:11:22,378 --> 01:11:27,538
Like, okay, we tolerate these in blocks, but I don't approve of them, so I'm not going to relay them.
1100
01:11:27,718 --> 01:11:29,718
That's not what filters are for, but go on.
1101
01:11:29,718 --> 01:11:34,858
No, no, no. But still, it reminds me of that South Park episode.
1102
01:11:35,058 --> 01:11:43,238
And I think there comes a point where we disapprove so much so that we don't tolerate anymore.
1103
01:11:43,438 --> 01:11:48,718
And I think that BIP-110 is sort of the immune system reacting to something that...
1104
01:11:49,618 --> 01:11:57,158
I'm hoping, I hope that BIP-110, regardless of whether it succeeds or fails, discourages spam on Bitcoin.
1105
01:11:57,158 --> 01:11:59,178
I think that that would be a good thing.
1106
01:11:59,718 --> 01:12:05,298
I think that using Bitcoin's block space as storage is a bad use.
1107
01:12:06,118 --> 01:12:09,918
But I do know, you know, look, I tell you one thing I did recently.
1108
01:12:10,138 --> 01:12:12,798
I was like, how hard would it be to evade BIP-110?
1109
01:12:13,718 --> 01:12:24,858
And I went into Cloud Code and I said, write code that encodes an image that is BIP-110 compliant.
1110
01:12:24,858 --> 01:12:27,998
and I want you to do it all in one shot
1111
01:12:27,998 --> 01:12:29,878
and post it to test net
1112
01:12:29,878 --> 01:12:32,378
and don't come back to me until it's finished.
1113
01:12:33,478 --> 01:12:34,498
And 45 minutes later,
1114
01:12:34,498 --> 01:12:35,618
I had a test net transaction
1115
01:12:35,618 --> 01:12:36,758
with an image on the test net.
1116
01:12:37,398 --> 01:12:40,338
So that's how hard it is for somebody to evade it.
1117
01:12:40,338 --> 01:12:42,098
No, no, no, but I don't think anyone
1118
01:12:42,098 --> 01:12:43,978
on the BIP 110 side denies that.
1119
01:12:44,178 --> 01:12:44,238
Okay.
1120
01:12:44,458 --> 01:12:46,598
I don't think anyone denies that.
1121
01:12:47,098 --> 01:12:49,198
0.53% overhead.
1122
01:12:50,258 --> 01:12:52,418
That's how much more expensive it was for me.
1123
01:12:52,418 --> 01:12:57,738
and if i was to do the same transaction on op return it would have cost me four times as much
1124
01:12:57,738 --> 01:13:02,938
yeah so that's one of the reasons why op return isn't our problem is that no no no no
1125
01:13:02,938 --> 01:13:10,338
op return is too too expensive to actually incentivize and and also i yeah but i think
1126
01:13:10,338 --> 01:13:15,878
that the whole the whole op return thing that's it's the defeatist attitude like okay we're opening
1127
01:13:15,878 --> 01:13:21,278
we can't do anything about it yeah there was there was again that's like political you know
1128
01:13:21,278 --> 01:13:26,918
these guys think they're so politically savvy and then by like you know keeping things quiet and
1129
01:13:26,918 --> 01:13:31,178
posting this and blah blah blah and then they do stupid things like just you know look there's a
1130
01:13:31,178 --> 01:13:37,038
whole bunch of people who are upset by it how hard would it have been to put the 160 or the 200 you
1131
01:13:37,038 --> 01:13:42,498
know bite cap on it and say look here's a list of use cases we think are monetary use cases
1132
01:13:42,498 --> 01:13:48,918
and that's why we're putting this higher cap on it and then also um everything's getting mined and
1133
01:13:48,918 --> 01:13:49,798
no one's stopping it.
1134
01:13:50,078 --> 01:13:54,178
And also relays are there to protect nodes from DDoSs,
1135
01:13:54,238 --> 01:13:55,858
not to filter transactions.
1136
01:13:56,398 --> 01:13:59,418
And if they had put the list of monetary use cases in there
1137
01:13:59,418 --> 01:14:00,558
and this and that,
1138
01:14:00,798 --> 01:14:02,078
would have been a much stronger argument.
1139
01:14:02,518 --> 01:14:03,458
No one would have complained.
1140
01:14:04,258 --> 01:14:07,298
And none of this would have spiraled out of control.
1141
01:14:09,378 --> 01:14:10,578
But, you know, I don't know.
1142
01:14:10,758 --> 01:14:12,798
I mean, maybe it was almost done on purpose
1143
01:14:12,798 --> 01:14:14,298
so that it did spiral out of control.
1144
01:14:14,298 --> 01:14:15,738
You know, that's the other thing is like,
1145
01:14:15,798 --> 01:14:17,758
how far into game theory is this?
1146
01:14:18,158 --> 01:14:18,378
Yeah, yeah.
1147
01:14:18,378 --> 01:14:24,038
Miners are incentivized to mine as many transactions as they can, right?
1148
01:14:24,118 --> 01:14:26,278
They want as many fees as they can get.
1149
01:14:26,358 --> 01:14:27,598
They want shitcoin on Bitcoin.
1150
01:14:28,418 --> 01:14:38,058
Miners want it to be flooded with stupid transactions because it doesn't harm their investment, at least not obviously.
1151
01:14:39,438 --> 01:14:41,758
And miners are often very short-sighted that way.
1152
01:14:42,278 --> 01:14:45,618
They see that 20% and they're like, hey, that's what I want.
1153
01:14:45,658 --> 01:14:46,438
I want more of that.
1154
01:14:46,438 --> 01:14:53,138
No, this is a super big problem because you have the highest time preference in mining and the lowest time preference in hodlers.
1155
01:14:53,498 --> 01:14:56,538
And that is not a good incentive structure.
1156
01:14:57,278 --> 01:14:58,698
No, it is. It's definitely.
1157
01:14:59,818 --> 01:15:12,178
And then, you know, as a developer, as a core developer, you need to balance miners, holders and exchanges and all of their demands on your network.
1158
01:15:12,178 --> 01:15:15,198
and hopefully ignore most of them
1159
01:15:15,198 --> 01:15:19,138
because none of them are really terribly more important than the others.
1160
01:15:20,198 --> 01:15:22,098
Yeah, you need to satisfy all of them.
1161
01:15:22,238 --> 01:15:25,518
If you didn't have exchanges and merchants, Bitcoin would be useless.
1162
01:15:25,718 --> 01:15:27,698
If you didn't have holders, it would be valueless.
1163
01:15:27,698 --> 01:15:30,278
And if you didn't have miners, then that would be bad too.
1164
01:15:30,558 --> 01:15:35,798
Yeah, but I think the ones that are empowered too much are definitely the miners.
1165
01:15:35,998 --> 01:15:40,658
We don't need miners to be that powerful.
1166
01:15:40,658 --> 01:15:42,898
Like, I don't see that.
1167
01:15:43,118 --> 01:15:48,678
I think that if the scales are tilted some way, it's too much towards the miners.
1168
01:15:49,498 --> 01:15:50,438
It always has been.
1169
01:15:50,758 --> 01:15:52,138
Yeah, always has been.
1170
01:15:52,278 --> 01:15:52,998
Scales have been tilted.
1171
01:15:53,178 --> 01:15:55,318
And honestly, I think the exchanges, too.
1172
01:15:55,418 --> 01:15:56,458
I think we cater to.
1173
01:15:56,558 --> 01:16:00,378
I think Coinbase is an enemy of Bitcoin, and everybody should know that.
1174
01:16:01,018 --> 01:16:03,378
Yes, yes, yes, yes.
1175
01:16:03,558 --> 01:16:04,398
I love this.
1176
01:16:05,218 --> 01:16:16,183
No exchanges And that is like people always say don buy your Bitcoins on a KYC exchange But even more importantly don sell them to a KYC exchange
1177
01:16:16,963 --> 01:16:17,443
Yeah.
1178
01:16:18,003 --> 01:16:19,483
You don't want any of that.
1179
01:16:19,843 --> 01:16:22,243
You don't want the exchanges to have any Bitcoin.
1180
01:16:22,543 --> 01:16:25,723
Like, drain them of them and just take them into self-custody.
1181
01:16:25,883 --> 01:16:27,923
Yeah, don't leave them on there.
1182
01:16:28,163 --> 01:16:31,043
Definitely self-custody if you do acquire it on there.
1183
01:16:31,043 --> 01:16:35,563
And as soon as you get it off there, mix it because you just, you think it's going to be fine.
1184
01:16:35,563 --> 01:16:37,423
but they just changed the law this year.
1185
01:16:37,543 --> 01:16:38,823
They changed the law fast.
1186
01:16:39,343 --> 01:16:40,043
You know, I don't know if you know,
1187
01:16:40,103 --> 01:16:41,383
in the United States right now,
1188
01:16:41,523 --> 01:16:43,443
Coinbase is sending IRS information
1189
01:16:43,443 --> 01:16:44,843
about everybody who owns Bitcoin.
1190
01:16:45,363 --> 01:16:47,783
It's like a new form, something, something, DM.
1191
01:16:49,223 --> 01:16:52,943
You know, that wasn't true until just this year.
1192
01:16:53,583 --> 01:16:55,283
And so you thought you were safe.
1193
01:16:55,383 --> 01:16:57,103
You thought you could just fudge your numbers
1194
01:16:57,103 --> 01:16:57,823
and blah, blah, blah.
1195
01:16:57,943 --> 01:16:58,623
Well, guess what?
1196
01:16:58,663 --> 01:16:59,163
You can't.
1197
01:16:59,183 --> 01:17:01,083
So any coins you had on exchange
1198
01:17:01,083 --> 01:17:02,403
for any significant amount of time,
1199
01:17:02,403 --> 01:17:04,663
there is no way you're getting out
1200
01:17:04,663 --> 01:17:12,583
of paying full you know uh taxes on every every nickel that you traded on those coins um and people
1201
01:17:12,583 --> 01:17:15,803
have been people have been trying to use it as a tax dodge and now they're just going to go to
1202
01:17:15,803 --> 01:17:22,463
prison so um it's it's they're gonna they're coming down hard and in ways that suck um they
1203
01:17:22,463 --> 01:17:28,023
shut down all those banks like it was insane you know like they just like randomly shut down banks
1204
01:17:28,023 --> 01:17:29,003
No, and it's obvious.
1205
01:17:29,223 --> 01:17:29,883
It's obvious.
1206
01:17:30,063 --> 01:17:33,023
They want to tax you for using money they can't print.
1207
01:17:33,743 --> 01:17:36,483
They want to punish you for not being punished.
1208
01:17:36,483 --> 01:17:37,503
For using money they can't print.
1209
01:17:37,923 --> 01:17:41,683
Yeah, they want to punish you for refusing to be punished for nothing.
1210
01:17:42,363 --> 01:17:43,423
That's basically it.
1211
01:17:43,843 --> 01:17:44,643
And it's awful.
1212
01:17:44,883 --> 01:17:50,743
And imagine if the most popular exchange in the world was a decentralized exchange where we did atomic swaps.
1213
01:17:51,463 --> 01:17:52,043
Yeah, yeah.
1214
01:17:53,963 --> 01:17:55,023
That would be better.
1215
01:17:55,983 --> 01:17:57,003
It would be better, right?
1216
01:17:57,003 --> 01:18:03,363
But it can't happen unless we get at least a couple little tiny opcodes on Bitcoin that allow DEXs to happen.
1217
01:18:03,863 --> 01:18:06,823
Although I have seen some Lightning exchanges that exist.
1218
01:18:07,003 --> 01:18:08,503
Apparently, you can do Tether on Lightning.
1219
01:18:08,923 --> 01:18:10,523
There's quite a bit of Tether on Lightning.
1220
01:18:10,543 --> 01:18:16,763
I had a great conversation with Giacomo about exactly that this morning and the pros and cons of that.
1221
01:18:17,343 --> 01:18:19,943
Because I don't really want Tether to be on Lightning.
1222
01:18:20,423 --> 01:18:22,583
But anyway, that's a different debate.
1223
01:18:22,583 --> 01:18:32,463
I don't love it, but at the same time, I understand the need for people to be able to switch from one system to another.
1224
01:18:32,923 --> 01:18:33,003
Yeah.
1225
01:18:33,203 --> 01:18:37,663
I don't, especially because, you know, merchants don't all take it yet and this and that.
1226
01:18:37,903 --> 01:18:40,743
I was really happy when Square said like, oh, everyone's going to be able to take Bitcoin.
1227
01:18:40,863 --> 01:18:43,443
But then I was really sad when it turned out it wasn't really true.
1228
01:18:43,523 --> 01:18:45,923
It was just like everyone can, but nobody does.
1229
01:18:46,763 --> 01:18:47,143
Yeah, yeah.
1230
01:18:47,143 --> 01:18:54,143
no and it's perpetual dilemma as long as which is why i love cash and i and i love dark alley
1231
01:18:54,143 --> 01:19:02,163
trades and and uh not not conforming not not complying like we need to be resistant off of
1232
01:19:02,163 --> 01:19:09,563
venmo yeah they kicked me off for buying and selling bitcoin on venmo i never cheated anybody
1233
01:19:09,563 --> 01:19:14,423
um they kicked me off just because they found out that's what i was doing and they
1234
01:19:14,423 --> 01:19:21,683
they turned off my account they also turned off my wife's account and it's been 10 years
1235
01:19:21,683 --> 01:19:27,003
and we can't get a new account even with a new bank account new phone number they figure out who
1236
01:19:27,003 --> 01:19:32,643
the fuck i am and will not let me sign up that's how aggressive and that if you want to know how
1237
01:19:32,643 --> 01:19:37,763
how much banking hates bitcoin that's like the best example they kick you off they kick your
1238
01:19:37,763 --> 01:19:41,843
wife off who had nothing to do with it no no and then they prevent you or your wife from ever using
1239
01:19:41,843 --> 01:19:42,503
to get something.
1240
01:19:42,883 --> 01:19:44,363
It's a mafia organization.
1241
01:19:44,863 --> 01:19:45,863
It's absolutely a mafia.
1242
01:19:46,543 --> 01:19:48,443
Yes, and a bank account
1243
01:19:48,443 --> 01:19:49,943
is a two out of three multi-sig
1244
01:19:49,943 --> 01:19:50,763
between you, the bank,
1245
01:19:50,803 --> 01:19:51,283
and the government.
1246
01:19:51,863 --> 01:19:53,363
And they both have master keys.
1247
01:19:54,083 --> 01:19:55,743
But you need approval
1248
01:19:55,743 --> 01:19:57,403
from at least one of the two
1249
01:19:57,403 --> 01:19:58,743
in order to use your money.
1250
01:19:59,403 --> 01:19:59,783
So it's awful.
1251
01:19:59,783 --> 01:20:01,343
Keep as little money as possible
1252
01:20:01,343 --> 01:20:02,023
in that system
1253
01:20:02,023 --> 01:20:03,043
and keep as much in Bitcoin.
1254
01:20:03,043 --> 01:20:04,083
That's the best way to do it.
1255
01:20:04,703 --> 01:20:05,143
Absolutely.
1256
01:20:05,803 --> 01:20:06,223
Word.
1257
01:20:06,783 --> 01:20:09,203
I mean, Europe is just as bad,
1258
01:20:09,463 --> 01:20:10,403
if not worse.
1259
01:20:10,403 --> 01:20:12,363
we have the MICA regulation
1260
01:20:12,363 --> 01:20:14,443
I mean you used to be able to use
1261
01:20:14,443 --> 01:20:16,723
ATMs here in Spain up until
1262
01:20:16,723 --> 01:20:18,003
New Year's this year
1263
01:20:18,003 --> 01:20:20,583
after that you need ID
1264
01:20:20,583 --> 01:20:22,543
for even transactions under
1265
01:20:22,543 --> 01:20:24,183
a thousand euros so that
1266
01:20:24,183 --> 01:20:25,623
avenue is gone
1267
01:20:25,623 --> 01:20:28,523
and in France
1268
01:20:28,523 --> 01:20:30,743
there were these horrible attacks
1269
01:20:30,743 --> 01:20:32,483
only against people who had
1270
01:20:32,483 --> 01:20:34,123
sold on or
1271
01:20:34,123 --> 01:20:36,683
reported that they had coins
1272
01:20:36,683 --> 01:20:37,263
on exchanges
1273
01:20:37,263 --> 01:20:41,603
so if they had filed their taxes correctly
1274
01:20:41,603 --> 01:20:44,023
they were now attacked by gangs
1275
01:20:44,023 --> 01:20:46,703
with literal $15 wrenches
1276
01:20:46,703 --> 01:20:48,043
that's crazy
1277
01:20:48,043 --> 01:20:50,943
and that kidnapped parts of the family
1278
01:20:50,943 --> 01:20:51,863
and what not
1279
01:20:51,863 --> 01:20:53,823
so it was that in combination
1280
01:20:53,823 --> 01:20:55,083
with the ledger hack I think
1281
01:20:55,083 --> 01:20:58,023
but if you file your taxes
1282
01:20:58,023 --> 01:20:59,063
and you tell the government
1283
01:20:59,063 --> 01:20:59,903
and in the UN they can pass the law
1284
01:20:59,903 --> 01:21:02,643
that 100% of people who are going online
1285
01:21:02,643 --> 01:21:04,043
to play a video game
1286
01:21:04,043 --> 01:21:04,983
now have to show ID
1287
01:21:04,983 --> 01:21:06,543
yeah yeah it's awful
1288
01:21:06,543 --> 01:21:14,063
And that's why they want to protect the children and say that you can't use Facebook if you're under 16.
1289
01:21:14,503 --> 01:21:16,363
It's all about the ID stuff.
1290
01:21:16,503 --> 01:21:17,503
It's all about ID.
1291
01:21:18,443 --> 01:21:23,023
And the best story I heard about that is a small village in Holland during World War II,
1292
01:21:23,503 --> 01:21:26,603
where the guy burnt down the church where the honeypot was,
1293
01:21:26,843 --> 01:21:31,083
where everyone had registered their religious affiliation.
1294
01:21:31,663 --> 01:21:35,383
And that little town had like 70% more Holocaust survivors.
1295
01:21:35,383 --> 01:21:37,963
because they couldn't look up who the use were.
1296
01:21:38,203 --> 01:21:43,023
And it's just such a good story about Honeypots and KYC,
1297
01:21:43,243 --> 01:21:44,383
why it's so terrible.
1298
01:21:45,483 --> 01:21:50,463
The whole thing, KYC, money is the tool we use
1299
01:21:50,463 --> 01:21:52,343
to not have to know our customer.
1300
01:21:53,063 --> 01:21:55,063
Like it's the very purpose of money.
1301
01:21:55,323 --> 01:21:56,203
Otherwise it would be barter.
1302
01:21:56,943 --> 01:21:59,623
No, and if you trust the guy, if there's a guy in your family,
1303
01:21:59,623 --> 01:22:01,223
you can just pay you back later.
1304
01:22:01,503 --> 01:22:02,823
Like nobody cares.
1305
01:22:03,083 --> 01:22:05,203
You don't need money if you're friends.
1306
01:22:05,383 --> 01:22:07,063
You need money if you're not friends.
1307
01:22:07,163 --> 01:22:09,423
You need your money if you don't know your customer.
1308
01:22:10,143 --> 01:22:10,543
So, yeah.
1309
01:22:11,683 --> 01:22:14,163
Eric, it has been great to get to know you.
1310
01:22:14,543 --> 01:22:18,563
And I've been very being educated by you on certain stuff.
1311
01:22:18,963 --> 01:22:20,923
And I'm still not convinced about everything, of course.
1312
01:22:21,223 --> 01:22:21,663
That's okay.
1313
01:22:21,683 --> 01:22:22,883
But neither should I be.
1314
01:22:23,683 --> 01:22:23,843
Yeah.
1315
01:22:24,023 --> 01:22:26,503
Where do you want to send people on the internet?
1316
01:22:26,723 --> 01:22:30,323
Where can they find out more about you or the projects you're working on?
1317
01:22:31,283 --> 01:22:32,243
Q32.com.
1318
01:22:32,243 --> 01:22:33,643
Q
1319
01:22:33,643 --> 01:22:36,343
Yeah, that's all the crap I'm building is there
1320
01:22:36,343 --> 01:22:38,283
All the crap you're building
1321
01:22:38,283 --> 01:22:40,163
is on Q42.com
1322
01:22:40,163 --> 01:22:42,403
With that, this has been the Bitcoin Infinity
1323
01:22:42,403 --> 01:22:44,343
Show, thank you very much Eric, thank you for
1324
01:22:44,343 --> 01:22:46,543
watching, like, subscribe and brush your teeth
1325
01:22:46,543 --> 01:22:48,223
Until next time
1326
01:23:02,243 --> 01:23:32,223
Thank you.




